University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2004

The Political Battle for the Constitution
H. W. Perry
L. A. Scot Powe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Perry, H. W. and Powe, L. A. Scot, "The Political Battle for the Constitution" (2004). Constitutional Commentary. 391.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/391

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Articles

THEPOLITICALBAITLEFOR THE
CONSTITUTION*
H. W. Perry, Jr.**
L.A. Powe, Jr.***

I. INTRODUCTION
Battles over the meaning of the Constitution began before
the document was written, and they have continued through history at varying levels of intensity and salience. But an important
change regarding constitutional battles has gone largely unnoticed. Understanding the new terms of engagement helps us better explain the current behavior of many political actors, including Justices. We also believe that it may have significant
implications for the future.
Over the past two generations, the Democratic Party and
Republican Party have come to fundamentally different conceptions of the United States Constitution, and are visions that differ from the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Previously, albeit only periodically, one political party has had
serious disagreements with the Court, causing that party to articulate a separate constitutional vision. 1 What is new is that now
both parties have done so. Without much recognition, we have
reached a point where, in addition to the Constitution espoused
by the Supreme Court, we have two quite different constitutions
in waiting and in action, one attached to each political party.
* An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., August 29, 2002.
** Associate Professor of Law; Associate Professor of Government, The University of Texas.
*** Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas.
I. D. GRIER STEPHENSON, CAMPAIGNS & THE COURT (1999).
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Furthermore, unlike previous one-party episodes, this time the
phenomenon has not evaporated after a few years. Documenting
and understanding this phenomenon fully requires serious attention to both law and politics.
That the political parties have developed opposing visions
of the Constitution which in turn differ from the Supreme
Court's demonstrates that there can be useful constitutional interpretation distinct from that of the Court. 2 The debates of the
first Congresses showed as much. 3 More importantly, the rise
and persistence of these opposing visions has important implications for constitutional politics now and in the future. The fact
that each party's vision is quite opposed to the other's throws
light on the apocalyptic statements by each party over the past
five of six presidential elections4 concerning the inherent danger
of any Supreme Court appointee coming from the other party.
The exception was the election of 2004. Neither party's convention nor campaign reflected the constitutional differences we
shall describe. The reason was articulated in early September by
New York Times reporter Roger Cohen when he wrote that
"this vote has a theme: the war." 5 Quite understandably, war6
and national security trumped everything else. That said, it did
not take long after the election for the appointment of judges to
return front and center. Talk did turn to "nuclear options" but it
2. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); KEITH
E. WHITIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); Keith E. Whittington,
Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning,
33 POLITY 365 (2001)
3. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801 (1997).
4. "The composition of the Supreme Court is a hot issue in the presidential campaign, with both parties warning of evil days if the other side gets to name the next several Justices." Eugene Volokh, Where the Justices Are Unpredictable, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2000, at A27. The predictions began with Walter Mondale's statement that if the
Court "is replaced by Mr. Reagan, it could well be that our great cause of justice will be
doomed for the lifetime of everyone in this room." Linda Greenhouse, Taking the Supreme Court's Pulse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1984, at AS. The reason for the focus on the
Court during the Reagan-Mondale campaign was that the Justices were just flat-out old,
with a majority having been born in the Roosevelt administration-Teddy's. See L.A.
Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go, 25 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1227, 1234 n.17 (2000). In the
2000 campaign AI Gore stated that the Court was "at stake: ... Think about civil rights.
Think about women's rights. Think about human rights. Think about antitrust law. Think
about Federalism. All of these issue are on the ballot this Nov. 7." Shaila K. Dewan, The
Campaign: The Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at A14. Initially we thought the statement was just campaign rhetoric, but events proved Gore a wise and prescient candidate.
The election of the president did, indeed, turn on the Supreme Court and federalism.
5. Roger Cohen, A Global War: Many Fronts, Little Unity, N.Y. TIMES, "Week in
Review," Sept. 5, 2004, at Dl.
6. The war on terror, the Iraqi War, plus, amazingly, the Vietnam War.
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was not about war. The issue of the appointment of judges was
so contentious that Republicans threatened to use the "nuclear
option" and prevent filibusters. Thus far, it has gone unused. In
the end, the division helps explain the non-ideolofical nature of
all of the post-Bork nominees except Thomas. Absent profoundly differing constitutional visions, the current battles over
circuit court nominations might appear merely as tit-for-tat for
what Republicans did to Clinton nominees.
Understanding the split not only helps to e~lain and predict behavior, but it also raises larger questions. For example,
the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty is sometimes dismissed by the claim that the majority position will soon prevail. 9
If, however, the Court develops its own vision of the Constitution that is different from either party, it raises interesting issues
about democratic accountability. Perhaps, however, in a political
world where the parties have become more polarized, the Court
in forging a majority opinion is offering the bipartisanship that
the public purportedly wants but is otherwise lacking in Washington. For many reasons then- historical, behavioral, and theoretical- attention to this phenomenon is important.
Focusing on political parties is not something legal academics tend to do. 10 We know parties exist and differ on policy, and
we understand them as electoral organizations, but we often ignore them as crucial institutions in governing. 11 When it comes
to constitutional analysis, they fall off the radar screen. Legal
academics are not alone. Supreme Court opinions that describe
how our government works likewise ignore political parties. Justices opine about the balance of power between branches, or
7. A possible caveat is necessary with the fleeting nomination of Douglas Ginsburg, who was certainly conservative. But wit~ his pot-smoking and wife maintaining her
maiden name, he did not look like the true believer. The sentence in text was written before the nomination of Samuel Ali to.
8. It sheds an interesting light on Mark Tushnet's imaginative proposal in TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
9. See Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). But see Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme
Court and National Policy-Making, 70 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976).
10. Of course there are notable exceptions such as Bruce Ackerman and Larry
Kramer. And things are beginning to change. A symposium at Columbia Law School on
the role of political parties resulted in an entire issue being devoted to the topic. See 100
COLUM. L. REV. (2000).
II. Political scientists often differentiate among aspects of the party. They refer to
"party-in-the-electorate," "party-in-government", and "party-as-organization." When political
scientists refer to "pigs and "pies" they are usually not referring to nursery rhymes. See JOHN
ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
IN AMERICA (1995).
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how the administrative state functions, with hardly a reference to
the role of political parties. 12 Interbranch struggles and issues of
separation of powers today are often not the same as those described in the Federalist Papers, when parties did not exist. 13
What usually matters most today is whether we have divided
government, how divided it is, and how it is divided. Ignoring the
role of political parties when analyzing a governing arrangement
would be unthinkable to any serious modern student of government.
Political scientists view political parties as central to governance.14 The modern American state-indeed any modern democracy-cannot begin to be understood or explained without a
deep understanding of the role played by political parties. Parties are the primary institutions that articulate, aggregate, and
integrate interests in democratic polities. Moreover, understanding the positions of parties is the only way to understand the
"output" of government. As Morris Fiorina has noted, "the only
way collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist,
given our institutions, is through the agency of the political
party; in American politics, responsibility requires cohesive parties. " 15 Yet political scientists, like legal academics, have not
noted the creation of a constitutional vision within each party. 16
We proceed by describing the evolution of the parties' constitutional positions and then compare them to the position of
the Court. We cannot recount every jot, tittle, and perturbation,
and we often skip over several years. What matters is that at the

12. Redistricting cases require attention to parties, but even those opinions often
seem to belie an understanding of how things actually work.
13. Justices often cite THE FEDERALIST PAPERS or convention debates as their
guide. Insightful as Publius was, his description of how things would or should work did
not include a role for political parties. Most of the Founders abhorred the idea of political parties; nevertheless, they quickly developed. As such, undue reliance on Federalist
Papers and convention debates in light of the subsequent development of political parties
is ironically ahistorical. See L.A. Powe, Jr. & H.W. Perry, Political Parties and Separation
of Powers presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1, 2005.
14. According to E.E. Schattschneider, "political parties created democracy,
and ... democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties." ALDRICH, supra note 11, at 3
(quoting Schattschneider).
15. Id.
16. They do, however, talk about parties and the Court and the Constitution. See,
e.g., KEVIN MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE WAY TO BROWN (2003); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875-1891, AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002)

2004]

POLITICAL BATTLE FOR CONSTITUTION

645

end of our story, the parties have strikingly differing constitutional visions that have persisted and seem likely to persist.
Parties, of course, are complex institutions. Obviously not
each member of each party subscribes to every point that we
shall make. But the positions ascribed to each party faithfully
track the dominant national presidential wing of each party. We
have developed these party visions by systematically examining
the presidential platforms of the parties and statements by party
leaders in publications such as Congressional Quarterly and the
Congressional Almanac. We have also supplemented this more
systematic examination with statements and articles in other major press venues. While the presidential wings are generally more
ideologically "extreme," they are not as different from the
broader parties as they once were. Political scientists have demonstrated that both parties are becoming more cohesive, more
partisan, more polarized, and moving toward the ideological extremes. This is certainly true of the parties in Congress, 17 but
there is some debate about whether it is also true of partisan
identifiers in the public. 18 We also believe that the positions that
we ascribe to the parties will ring true to the reader.
To set the stage for a discussion of political parties, the Constitution, and the Court, and to set the baseline for our story, we
begin by retreading familiar ground. We recount two instances in
which one party agreed with the Court and the other did not.

17. On "party votes" (a majority of one party opposed a majority of the opposing
party), "party cohesion" (percentage of members of a party voting with a majority of
their own party) was 82.0% for Democrats and 86.5% for Republicans in the House during Clinton's first term. SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD & HANES WALTON, JR., POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 329 (2d ed. 2000). It continued between 80-90%. Party
scores in the Senate have been similar. Another score of party unity is Presidential support scores. During the Clinton administration, support of Clinton by Democrats was
quite high as was opposition by Republicans. See THE PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES IN
AMERICAN PARITES AND CAMPAIGNS 472 (L. SANDY MAISEL 3d ed. 1998). The trend
has continued and become more dramatic during the Bush Administration. For the 108th
Congress, House Republicans had a party unity score of 93.6 and House Democrats a
score of 90.8. Senate Republicans matched their House counterparts with a party unity
score of 93.6. Senate Democrats had a score of 89. Sean M. Thieriault Party Polarization
in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and Member Adaptation, PARTY POLITICS
(forthcoming); see also JON BOND AND RICHARD FLEISHER, POLARIZED POLITICS:
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (2000).
18. MORRIS FIORINA, CuLTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF POLARIZED AMERICA
(2005).
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II. PRELUDE: SLAVERY AND THE DEPRESSIONACKERMAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS
The rise of the modem mass political party is generally seen
as beginning with Andrew Jackson and the efforts of Martin Van
Buren in seeking the formation of a national Democratic Party.
Our story, however, can begin after the emergence of two national, competitive parties, the Whigs and the Democrats. Of
course, the crucial issue driving the parties and the polity was
slavery.
Although the Constitution seemingly left slavery to the
states, the Mexican War and territorial acquisition moved slavery to the top of the national agenda. The debate over slavery
split both national parties on sectional lines, doomed the Whigs,
and paved the way for an antislavery candidate to take the
presidency in 1860 with just 40 ~ercent of the popular vote and
no southern support whatsoever. 9
With slavery in the territories ripping both parties apart, it is
no wonder that politicians in the 1850s labored so hard to depoliticize the issue by framing it as one of "law" for the Supreme
Court. 20 Unlike the Democrats and Whigs, who understood that
slavery in the territories was too hot to handle, the Supreme
Court acce~ted the invitation to "finally" settle the issue with
Dred Scott. 1 Obviously, that didn't work. The Whigs were no
longer viable, and the newly formed Republican Party believed
that slavery was a blot on the nation that should be placed on its
way to an eventual extinction. Given the very limited powers of
the national government to deal with slavery, the only way that
essential ending was likely to occur was by a policy of containment- the very solution that Dred Scott barred.
The Republicans could not live in a world where Dred Scott
was law because a constitutional amendment to ban slavery in
the territories (or to give Congress that power) was a mathematical and political impossibility. 22 Halting the spread of slavery
19. "The territorial question sectionalized American politics and resulted in the
election of a sectional president." MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND TilE
AMERICAN WEST 256 (1997).
20. "From the statues of 1850 and 1854, it was evident that Congress would welcome a chance to rid itself of the vexing territorial issue. In fact, Congress had done all it
could to foster a judicial resolution of the problem." DAVID M. PoTTER, THE
IMPENDING CRISIS 271 (1976).
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. With over one-third of the states being slave states, gaining the three-quarters
Article V demands was unthinkable. It might have been easier to gain the three-quarters
for the Crittendon Amendments protecting slavery where it existed, compensating own-
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was a moral, not a partisan, position. That goal had created the
party in the wake of the Whigs' demise, and it was the only
common ground the purely northern Republicans shared. So
they developed instead an alternative constitution, one in which
Congress had the power to legislate on slavery in the territories.
What to do about Dred Scott? The case held that one black
man remained a slave, but the rest of the opinion was dicta and
any Justice appointed by a Republican president would be sworn
to repudiate that dicta. As Abraham Lincoln, hardly the most
hawkish Republican, stated immediately before his debates with
Stephen Douglas, "somebody has to reverse that decision since it
is made, and we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peaceably."23 Would he vote to bar slavery in a new territory? Of
course: "all that I am doing is refusing to obey [Dred Scott] as a
political rule. "24 Each member of a coordinate branch of the
government, he observed, is "sworn to uphold the Constitution- that each member had sworn to support the Constitution
as he understood it." 25
Lincoln and Republicans generally understood the Constitution to give Congress the power to ban slavery in the territories as the best option to continue what they held to be the
Framers' intent to extinguish slavery over time. When they acquired power in the 1860 election, they passed just such a law. 26
Over the next seven years, they took whatever steps necessaryfrom war, to barring the South from taking seats in Congress, to
military reconstruction, to impeachment of the President, to
stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of military reconstruction, to forcing the South to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition for readmission to
the "indestructible Union of indestructible States" 27 -to implement that vision. While the Democrats throughout retained their
vision of the Constitution in accordance with that of the Court,
the Reconstruction Amendments and the election of Grant rendered that view (temporarily) moot.
ers of runaway slaves, and extending the Missouri Compromise line. They, along with the
three-fifths clause, were to be forever unamendable.
23. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 451 (Library of
America 1989) (July 10, 1858, at Chicago).
24. /d. at 450.
25. /d. at 452.
26. 12 Stat. 432 (1862). The Congress elected in November 1860 would be not
scheduled to meet until December 1861 and came into special session July 4, 1861 without Southerners.
27. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,725 (1868).
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Seventy years later, faced with economic collapse, the Democrats created a new constitution for an activist national government. Their constitution, once accepted, has lasted to the
present. When Franklin Roosevelt suggested in his first inaugural that he might be required to assume powers normally exercised only in wartime, 28 he must have sensed that constitutional
problems would be lurking. By the time of the Gold Clause
Cases/ 9 he could be sure because he was prepared to announce
that the government would not comply with the decision30 -a
national discussion rendered unnecessary by the Supreme
Court's surprising decision to withhold the claimant's desired
remedy. 31 In New Deal circles a vastly more expansive notion of
federal powers- even broader than that held by the three liberal
Justices-emerged as the Court and the New Deal government
waged war over the scope of federal power to cope with the Depression.
The Court-packing plan and Owen Roberts's switch set the
stage for the New Deal's victory. 32 New Deal Justices Hugo L.
Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas,
Frank Murphy, Robert H. Jackson, and Wiley Rutledge sealed
that victory and guaranteed the ensuing revolution. 33 No longer
was the power to regulate the national economy a constitutional
issue. The New Deal Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it merged. The Republicans silently acquiesed.
The aftermath of the Civil War and the New Deal's Court
battles are, of course, Bruce Ackerman's prime "constitutional
moments" after the founding itself. 34 One need not agree with
Ackerman's project to recognize that the Democrats in the 1860s
28. "But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses,
and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, we shall not evade the clear
course of duty that will then confront me. We shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis-broad Executive power to wage a war against the
emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by
a foreign foe." JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 164
(1956).
29. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States,
294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
30. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 87-88
(1995).
31. Although the Court voted 8-1 that retroactively abandoning the promise to pay
in gold violated the Constitution, it held ~ that to grant the plaintiffs a remedy would
unjustly enrich them to the tune of $1.69 on the dollar.
32. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM fEAR 325-37 (1999).
33. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
34. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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and the Republicans in the 1930s embraced the older constitutional order that had been articulated by the Supreme Court and
were repudiated. What we are about to describe is different. It is
not one of Ackerman's constitutional moments by any means. 35
Nor does it involve an election (or elections) in which the voters
repudiate the Court. And most important, it does not involve a
single party differing from the Court. Instead, it is how the Republicans and then the Democrats over the past decades have
each developed a rather complete constitutional vision that differs significantly from that of the Court and each other and have
maintained that vision over time despite contrary decisions by
the Court.
Ill. ONE CONSTITUTION: THREE VIEWS
Invariably, when both parties and the Court split on constitutional interpretation, the Court has found itself between the
parties. Beginning with the mature Warren Court, there have
been four issues on which this three-way split exists (or existed
for at least thirty years): the rights of those accused of crime, the
ability of government to make race-based decisions, abortion,
and the relationship between government and religion, especially prayer in schools. 36 Strikingly, none of the four issues had
received significant national attention before the Court's key decisions. Indeed, with respect to prayer and abortion, the issues
had never been debated in Congress as matters of policy, much
less constitutional law, prior to the Court's decisions.
All four areas result in substantial part from the retreat
from the liberalism of the mature Warren Court, the continuing
leftward movement of the Democratic Party for the quartercentury after Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory, and the dramatic rightward thrust that Ronald Reagan gave the Republican
Party. Not surprisingly, the parties' positions on all four issues
were initially politically driven. There is an additional issue that
splits the parties. That is the role of the Court itself. We begin
there and then proceed to the four substantive issues.
35.

A different but complementary source making the same point is MARK V.

TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003).

36. Because we focus on areas where the parties differ both with each other and the
Court, we will not discuss areas, such as presidential war-making, where the parties
(may) differ with each other, but where the Court has taken no position. Another reason
for avoiding presidential powers is that the parties' positions have a decidedly opportunistic slant depending on who controls the presidency. As discussed below there may well
be other areas involving a similar three-way split.
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A. THE SUPREME COURT: GREAT OR SMALL?

From its lofty pronouncements in Cooper v. Aaron/ 7 Powell
v. McCormack, 38 and United States v. Nixon, 39 to Casey's 40 musings on the relationship between the Court and "the country's
understanding of itself as a constitutional republic," 41 the Court
has periodically pondered its role in the American system of
government. But each party has a more basic view of the Court,
which speaks to each of the four issues on which the parties are
divided.
It is all but impossible to believe that Franklin Roosevelt
never inserted the Court, even obliquely, into the 1936 campaign. However urgently he might have wanted to change its rulings, Roosevelt remained silent until he announced the Courtpacking plan three months after his landslide victory. Roosevelt
had more reason to attack the Court than any other twentieth
century president, but no major party candidate had discussed
the Court during a presidential campaign during the century,42
and he didn't either. 43 Barry Goldwater, after wrenching his
party away from the so-called "me too" Republicans, 44 broke
37. 358 u.s. 1 (1958).
38. 395 u.s. 486 (1969).
39. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
40. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(plurality). Casey goes further than Cooper, Powell, or Nixon because the plurality also
orders the losers to still their voices on the topic of abortion.
41. ld. at 865. Justice Jackson once opined that the Court was not final because it
was infallible; it was infallible only because it was final. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540
(1953)(dissent). Now, if O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter are to be believed, the Court is
infallible-at least in truly big cases-because the country wants it so.
42. Although Progressives in both parties were hostile to judicial review and the
Supreme Court in the first quarter of the century, Robert LaFollette's third-party effort
in 1924 was the first to attack the Court during an election campaign. By 1922 he had already claimed in a published article that the "Supreme Court Rules the Nation."
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 314 n.67
(2000). His Progressive Party's platform called for both direct election of federal judges
and a grant of power to Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions. KENNETH
CAMPBELL MACKAY, PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 11, 144 (1947). An even stronger
statement comes in 1912 from Eugene Debs's Socialist Party Platform calling judicial
review of federal legislation a "usurpation" and demanding its abolition so that a federal
statute could only be repealed by Congress itself or a national referendum of the people.
3 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2202--{)3 (Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. & Fred L. Israel, eds., 1971 ).
43. Nor did his cabinet. "[P]ublication of Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace's
systemic critique of the Court was delayed." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 150. Stephenson aptly notes that direct attacks on the Court would have played into the Republican
argument that FDR was an aspiring dictator. !d. at 150-51. But see KEVIN McMAHON,
RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE WAY TO
BROWN (2003) (discussing FOR's strategy contemplating the use of law).
44. The wing now called the Rockefeller (or country club) Republicans.
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that tradition in his suicidal campaign against Lyndon Johnson,
the New Deal, and the liberalism of the 1960s.45 That liberalism
was coalescing around the view that a Great Society needs a
Great Supreme Court46 and that the United States already had
one headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
With the Warren Court as its ideal, Democratic liberals
came to a constitutional vision totally opposed to their Progressive roots and the Democratic Party's previous positions. The
United States needs a big Court, one willing to stand up to both
Congress and the states in defense of newly created rights. With
Brown,47 Enge/,48 Gideon,49 Rernolds,50 and the dismantling of
the domestic-security program 5 as models, Democrats not only
abandoned their prior fears of conservative or reactionary
Courts; they embraced an activist judiciary capable of protecting
and enlarging individual rights that even liberal legislatures
might hesitate to protect.
Roe v. Wade 52 sealed the deal. Moreover, it showed the political wisdom of the four liberals on the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposing Richard Nixon's nomination of the incompetent segregationist, G. Harrold Carswell, to the Court, (in part)
because he was "insensitive to human rights" 53 and might prove
"timorous in the responsibility he has to knock down a law
which Congress may pass" that violates the Constitution. 54 Harry
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and later David Souter were neither
insensitive nor timorous and accordingly were able to gravitate
toward the ideal of a Great Court. Therefore, despite Republi45. In two books, THE POLmCS OF RAGE (1995) and FROM GEORGE WALLACE
TO NEWT GINGRICH (1996) and a two-part PBS American Experience program, Setting
the Woods on Fire, Dan T. Carter has persuasively portrayed George Wallace as the precursor to the Republican Party of the past two decades. We dissent with trepidation from
such a perceptive historian, but on the point of creating and articulating an alternative
constitution, Goldwater was first. Wallace added race as an essential theme, but he came
later.
46. Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Constitutional Law, 79 TEX. L. REV. 163, 187
(2000).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
(2000).

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1%3).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1%4).
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 310-17

52. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
53. Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, Exec. Rep. 91-14 at 13 (91st Cong.
2nd Sess. 1970) (individual views of Sen. Birch Bayh, Philip A. Hart, Edward M. Kennedy, and Joseph D. Tydings).
54. George Harrold Carswell, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary 40
(91st Cong. 2nd. Sess. 1970) (Sen. Birch Bayh).
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can dominance of the selection process, whereby a quarter of a
century passed between the nominations of Thurgood Marshall
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Democrats with their rightsbased universalism55 did not waver on what the Court should be
doing.
For Democrats, there was an important division of labor between the Court and the elected branches in a joint march toward complementary goals. 56 The elective branches would take
the initiative to create and implement necessary legislation (with
the Court quick to validate their actions). Where the legislative
process was unsuited to deal with a given problem-such as
Goldwater's two main targets, criminal procedure and school
prayer-then the Court would take the lead, while Congress and
the President would approve its actions. 57 "It was simply a matter of determining which institution was best-suited to handle a
specific problem. "58 Thus the Court took responsibility for reforming criminal justice because it was "the branch of government most familiar with the problems and most capable of supervising the solutions." 59
By contrast, Goldwater articulated what would be the Republican Party's position for the rest of the century. Regardless
of its staffing, the federal judiciary had become too big for its
own breeches, much less the country's. Thus of all three
branches of government, "today's Supreme Court is least faithful
to the constitutional tradition of limited government, and to the
principle of legitimacy in the exercise of power. "60
Republicans ran against the Warren Court in both 1964 and
1968,61 and they wanted a truly diminished role for any future
Court. Yet Republicans could not find the clean picture of an
ideal Court that the Democrats possessed because Republicans
wanted some, but not much, judicial intervention. Nixon's "strict
55. See JOHN GERRING, PARTY IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 253 (1998). The 1972
Democratic platform committed the party "to resuming the march toward equality: to
enforcing the laws supporting court decisions and enacting new legal rights as necessary
to assure every American true opportunity, to bring about a more equitable distribution
of power, income and wealth." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1730 (1972).
56. Because the idea of the Great Court crystallized during the Great Society, the
operative assumption was that the elected branches would be controlled by the Democrats.
57. President Kennedy provided the perfect model here with his strong defense of
Engel. See POWE,supra note 51, at 189.
58. Id. at 214.
59. /d. at 494.
60. 22 CONG. Q. 2534 (1964).
61. See POWE, supra note 51, at 238,391-92,410,474-75.
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constructionist" and "judicial restraint" were about as good as
could be done. 62 The Bushes prefer "not legislating from the
bench. " 63 Even as Republicans came to condemn Roe v. Wade,
they did not wish to adopt the stance of the Progressives and
claim judicial review was illegitimate.
The only effort after the Carswell nomination that the Republicans attempted to delegitimize the Court came from Attorney General Edwin Meese. In a 1985 speech to the American
Bar Association he demanded a jurisprudence of original intent.64 A little over a year later in a speech commemorating the
Bicentennial of the Constitution, he proclaimed the obvious fact
that there was a distinction between Supreme Court decisions
and the Constitution itself, but then offered a controversial attack on Cooper v. Aaron 65 that only the text of the Constitution
represented "the supreme law of the Land." 66 Three weeks later,
Meese recanted, claiming on~ that there was a right to criticize
the Court and its decisions. Meese's trial balloon had been
greeted by a cascade68 of anathemas and was virtually undefended (if not indefensible). 69 Furthermore, Republicans knew
62. Nixon promised that his "nominees to the high court ... would be strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting law not making law." E.W. Kenworthy,
Nixon, in Texas, Sharpens His Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1968, at 1, 79. It is interesting
how closely Nixon's language comes to that of liberals in condemning substantive due
process. For example: "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation .... We
refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weight the wisdom of legislation,' and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."' Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,729,731-32 (1963).
63. Like father: Susan Page, Bush Selects Little-Known Judge, NEWSDAY, July 24,
1990 at 3, like son: Rick Klein, Miers Speeches Backed Stronger Executive Branch,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2005, at Al.
64. Edwin Meese, III, The Attorney-General's View on the Supreme Court: Toward
A Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 701 (1985).
65. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): ("Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution
the 'supreme Law of the Land.' In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as 'the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation,' declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that 'It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'").
66. Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution (delivered at Tulane University,
October 21, 1986); Edwin Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TULANE L. REV.
979 (1987).
67. Edwin Meese, III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,
1986, at A21, reprinted in 61 TULANE L. REv. 1003 (1987).
68. Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TULANE
L. REV. 991,991 n.1 (1987) (collecting sources).
69. Anthony Lewis accused Meese of "making a calculated assault on the idea of
law in this country." Law or Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23. While finding
Meese to be like "a stopped clock [that] is right twice a day," Sandy Levinson offered the
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that some government actions relating to race or restraining the
(typically Republican) President could slide over the constitutional line, and they wanted a Supreme Court capable of saying
so (not to mention that such a Court might be necessary to
"save" the country from the anarchy70 of having a state court or
legislature or the United States House of Representatives
choose the nation's President). 71 Nevertheless, the very examples
of "beyond the Beltway" jurists, who seemed less conservative
on the Court than when nominated, 72 caused Republicans to
worry that the Court itself was, at some fundamental level, untrustworthy.
Republicans often advocated achieving their constitutional
vision through the Article V process. This has been merely a tactical way of signaling a desired constitutional outcome by an appeal to what appears to be a politically popular outcome. At all
times the Republicans have believed that the Constitution,
properly interpreted, yielded their desired outcome. The barrier
was the Court's erroneous interpretation. The Article V route
was necessary because it seemed highly unlikely that the Court
would reverse course in the near future. Essentially Republicans
demanded constitutional reform only when the offending decision commanded at least seven Justices. When the results were
closer, 5-4 and 6-3, the Republicans did not call for an amendment. Instead they looked to normal attrition (two Justices per
presidential term) to pave the way for the necessary constitutional change.
Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats have never demanded a constitutional amendment to overturn an unfavorable
Supreme Court opinion. This may have resulted from the Democrats' belief in a Great Supreme Court and the assumption
that revising a decision by amendment would undermine that belief. Or it may have stemmed from the fact that the Democratic
sound historical perspective that Meese's speech echoed the views of both Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Sanford V. Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?,
243 THE NATION 689 (1986) reprinted in 61 TULANE L. REV.1071, 1078 (1987).
70. Paul Gigot, Liberals Discover the Tyranny of the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
2000, at A16 ("saved the country from another month of fighting before reaching the
same result"); Charles Krauthammer, Defenders of the Law, WASH. POST, December 15,
2000, at A41 (averted "a true constitutional crisis").
71. Or saving the country from the trauma of not knowing for about another month
who the next president would be (something that had always been handled well enough
in the month prior to any election).
72. Unlike Scalia and Thomas (as well as Bork and Rehnquist), who were nominated while working within the District, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter each came to the Court from outside the Beltway.
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side of contested issues was never sufficiently popular to make a
constitutional amendment even thinkable. More to the point, the
Democrats fudged how strongly they supported a given proposition. As discussed below, strong church-state separation and
quota-like affirinative action are prime examples.
With divergent visions of the Court serving as the backdrop,
we turn to the evolution of the parties' divergent visions of the
Constitution.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. Try the Criminal, Not the Police: Goldwater's attack on
the Court for "contributing to the breakdown of law and order
in the cities" 73 echoed attacks by police chiefs on Mapp 74 and
Escobedo. 75 Even former President Eisenhower urged Republican delegates at the 1964 convention "not to be guilty of maudlin
sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the street with
switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a prey [sic], suddenly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged person who counts upon the compassion of our society and the
weakness of many courts to forgive his offense." 76 But the Republican attack on the Court was Rremature. Americans did not
yet perceive crime as a major issue; 77 by Miranda, 78 they would. 79
In retrospect, especially after both Nixon and George Wallace expanded Goldwater's critique in the context of rising crime
rates and annual summer race riots, the "law and order" position
had come to be seen as being about race. But Goldwater was no
racist, having opposed the Civil Rights Act on libertarian principles, and Americans could be genuinely disturbed about the
decade's rising crime rates. "Law and order was a separable issue
from race but it was not always a separated issue. " 80 Beginning at
least with Gerald Ford in 1966, Republicans fused race and
crime for political gain: "How long are we going to abdicate law
and order-the backbone of civilization-in the form of the soft

POWE, supra note 51, at 391-92.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1%1}.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 241-42 (1965).
Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the Supreme
Court, 32 PUB. OPINION Q. 31, 36 (1968).
78. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
79. POWE, supra note 51, at 399-400.
80. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 382 (1983) (emphasis
in original).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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social theory that the man who throws a brick through your window or tosses a fire bomb into your car is simply the misunderstood and underprivileged product of a broken home?" 81 Eventually, we would have Willie Horton ads.
Fusing race and crime did work politically, but it would be a
mistake to discount concerns over crime. "The right to be free
from domestic violence" 82 can stand on its own. 83 Miranda, after
all, had been accompanied by stories of confessed murderers going free 84 and Senator Sam Ervin was not alone in his reaction
that "enough has been done for those who murder and rape and
rob!" 85 That held true regardless of the race of the criminal.
Nixon argued that Miranda nearly ruled out confessions as a law
enforcement tool86 and his punch line during the 1968 campaign
was that "some of the courts have gone too far in weakening the
peace forces against the criminal forces." 87 Wallace, of course,
went further, much further. 88 Their campaigns tapped a growing
concern over personal safety, 89 and they firmly embedded in the
Republican Constitution the idea that the criminal trial should
be about the defendant's guilt or innocence, not about police
(mis)behavior. 90 "We must reestablish the principle that men are
accountable for what they do and that criminals are responsible
for their crimes." 91 When the Court put the death penalty into
play,92 the Republicans proclaimed their fealty to it. 9

81. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, PoLmCS AND POLICY 286 (1968) (quoting Ford).
82. John W. Finney, Nixon and Reagan ask War on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1968, at 1. By domestic violence Nixon did not mean intrafamily violence; he meant violence by strangers.
83. Nixon did not always see it that way. After watching a "law and order" commercial he stated, "this hits it right on the nose .... It's all about law and order and the
damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there." JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE
PRESIDENT 1968, at 23 (1969).
84. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 185 (1970).
85. Nan Robertson, Ervin Protests Curbs on Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1966, at
54.
86. POWE, supra note 51, at 410.
87. 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON 154 (1989).
88. GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 10 ("If you walk out of this hotel tonight and someone knocks you on the head, he'll be out of jail before you're out of the hospital, and on
Monday morning they'll try the policeman instead of the criminal.").
89. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 201 ("In the past forty-five minutes this is what
happened in America. There has [sic] been one murder, two rapes, forty-five major
crimes of violence, countless robberies and auto thefts.").
90. See 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 906 (1976)("Emphasis must be on protecting the
innocent and punishing the guilty.").
91. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 988 (1968).
92. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
93. 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 906 (1976).
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Crime had become a Republican issue. Republican platforms robustly emphasized the problem of violence in society
and the need for public safety. 94 They were never conflicted on
whether or how to use the issue. Republicans worked to solve
the crime problem; Democrats contributed to it. "We have solid
evidence the war on crime is being won. The American people
know that once again the thrust of justice in our society will be
to protect the law-abiding citizenry against the criminals rather
than absolvin.R the criminal of the consequences of his own desperate acts." Even before the Willie Horton ads, the elder
George Bush sounded as if he were running against the American Civil Liberties Union (in which Michael Dukakis had trumpeted his membership while seeking the Democratic nomination).96 However much the Court retreated, first under Burger
and then under Rehnquist, it was never enough for Republicans.
The hated Miranda and Mapp decisions had to be overruled, and
they weren't. Indeed when Miranda's day came, it was reaffirmed by Rehnquist with two more positive votes than it originally garnered. 97
2. The Criminal Justice Process Must Be Scrupulously Fair:
Democrats applauded the Warren Court's criminal procedure
decisions. 98 No elected branch of government could have taken
the antiquated criminal justice system and transformed it, especially against skeptical or hostile public opinion. Like the views
of Nixon's "law and order," however, the Democrats' views on
crime were intertwined with race. Just as African-Americans had
been major beneficiaries of the Warren Court's revolution, so
too were they disproportionately involved with the criminal justice system, and Democrats would not consider appearing hostile. Thus the 1968 platform, which firmly established the party's
positions for at least two decades, stated that the "entire nation

94. "Republicans will address real problems that face Americans in their neighborhoods day by day-deterioration and urban blight, dangerous streets and violent crime
that makes millions of Americans ... fearful in their own neighborhood and prisoners in
their own homes." 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 64B (1980). "Safety and security are vital to
the health and well-being of people in their neighborhoods and communities." /d. at 66B.
"Those convicted of serious offenses must be jailed swiftly, surely and long enough to
ensure public safety." 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 51B (1984).
95. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 2160 (1972).
96. David G. Savage, Strategy Focuses Attention on Liberal Group, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1988, at 14: "Dukakis' 'entire attitude' on social issues is 'best summed up in
four little letters: A.C.L.U.,' Bush said."
97. United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
98. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 9 (1991).
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is united in its concern over crime" and then proceeded to treat
the issue as if it were political poison.99
Pledging a "vigorous and sustained campaign against lawlessness in all its forms," 100 the Democrats placed organized
crime and white collar crime first. Murder, rape, armed robbery,
and other violent crimes were unmentionable by name. These
were simply placed last as "other violations of the rights and liberties of others," as if they were incidentals or accidents. 101 In
subse';louent years the Democrats would decry domestic violence, 2 violence against "health care providers" and their female patients/ 03 and the "unethical and unlawful greed among
too many of those who have been governing our nation," 104 but
not until Bill Clinton's candidacy did the Democrats acknowledge forthrifohtly that "crime is a relentless danger to our communities."10
Because questioning criminality was deemed racist, the
Democratic response was to ignore the criminal-except to assure everyone that his rights were to be respected and to pledge
to attack the "root causes" of crime: "in fighting crime we must
not foster injustice. Lawlessness cannot be ended by curtailing
the hard-won liberties of all Americans." 106 "We can protect all
people without undermining fundamental liberties by ceasing to
use law and order as a justification for repression. " 107
By 1972, and especially thereafter, those liberties that had
been "hard-won" under the Warren Court were being quite successfully undermined by the Burger Court. 108 The Democrats
were doubly frozen. They did not believe that hard-won rights
should be changed, 109 calling for "fairness in every part of the
criminal justice system." 110 The 1980 platform talked of reform,
24 CONG Q. ALMANAC 1040 (1968).
!d.
!d.
36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1068 (1980).
40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 938 (1984).
44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988).
48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 62A (1992).
24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1040 (1968).
Id.
Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practices" Phases of the Criminal Process and the
Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143 (Herman Schwartz ed.,
1987).
109. In 1976 the Democrats stated that they supported criminal justice reform, "but
we oppose any legislative effort to introduce repressive and anti-civil libertarian measures in the guise of reform." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 863 (1976).
110. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1739 (1972).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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but always with caveats that could have been written by the
ACLU: "scrupulously protecting fundamentalliberties," 111 "the
very real concern about protecting civilliberties," 112 "fully protecting civilliberties." 113 Nowhere did a platform show such concerns for protection against violent crime; the 1980 platform,
quoted above, worried instead about "excessive or illegal police
force." 114 In what is nice retrospective irony, the Democrats worried less about violence than how the "unethical and unlawful
greed among too many of those who have been governing our
nation, procuring our weapons and polluting our environment
has made far more difficult the daily work of local policemen,
teachers and parents who must convey to our children respect
for justice and authority." 115 The crimes that should concern
Americans were those that Republicans were prone to commit.
The 1972 platform was especially interesting. First, it sought
to blame the rise in crime on the Nixon administration. 116 Then it
devoted more space to advocating the restoration of the rights of
ex-felons than to combating street violence. 117 In 1980 domestic
violence received more attention than all other crimes, which
were unmentioned by name but nevertheless "condemned," but
then quickly understood as parts of "a life of poverty and despair" which Democrats would attempt to remedy. 118 Four years
later, the Democrats condemned the Ku Klux Klan and other
hate groups, but never mentioned violent crime even under the
sonorous euphemism of "other violations of rights and liberties."119 They were opposed in 1984, however, to the sale of
"snub-nosed handguns" 120 and, four years later, so-called "cop
killer" bullets. 121
In retrospect, Michael Dukakis's pod-person response in the
1988 Presidential debate to the hypothetical concerning the rape

Ill. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1068 (1980).
112. /d.
113. /d. at 1088.
114. /d. at 1098.
115. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988).
116. Nixon's pledge "to strengthen the 'peace forces' ... has been broken [and]
[v]iolent crime has increased by one-third ... Effective law enforcement requires tough
planning and actions. This Administration has given us nothing but tough words ... (and]
unequal law enforcement." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 1739 (1972).
117. /d. at 1740.
118. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1058 (1980)
119. /d. at 948.
120. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 978 (1984).
121. 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 88A (1988).
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and murder of his wife is fully explicable. 122 Democrats worried
about hard-won liberties and the possibility that repression and
miserly federal spending precluded the alleviation of the root
causes of crime. Thus while Democrats saw the Willie Horton ad
as Nixon's "law and order" redux, Republicans saw Horton as
the symbol of the logical outgrowth of the Democrats' obsessive
concern with the rights of criminals (and not simply those just
accused of crime) and the Democrats' lack of concern over crime
itself. 123
Bill Clinton did not repeat Dukakis's errors. He returned to
Arkansas just before the 1992 New Hampshire primary to oversee the execution of Rickey Ray Rector, an African-American
cop-killer who gave himself a frontal lobotomy by a gunshot
wound to the head and thereby reduced himself to the erratic
comprehension of a young child. 124 For a variety of reasons, not
the least of which was demographic, violent crime dropped during the Clinton era, and crime was not an issue in the 2000 election. The problem of mistakes in the capital punishment system
received full media attention, but it was a press issue, not one in
which the Democratic ticket showed the slightest interest even
though the Texas system was an extremely inviting target.
In giving his support to a constitutional amendment on victims' rights (in time for the 1996 campaign), Clinton stated that
he had "learned what every victim of crime knows too well: As
long as the rights of the accused are protected and the rifhts of
victims are not, time and again, the victims will lose." 12 After
the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton had shown that Democrats, too, could be tough on criminals. He "vigorously sugported"126 the Effective Death Penalty and Antiterrorism Act, 7
a Republican measure-taken from Newt Gingrich's Contract
with America-to speed the habeas process and supposedly to

122. Richard Cohen, A Man in Hiding, Wash. POST, Oct. 16,1988, at C7.
123. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 224.
124. His pistol shot to his head (corning after he had casually shot the police officer)
took away the front three inches of his brain. Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas: Annals
of Law and Politics, 69 THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105. Rector left the dessert
from his last meal uneaten because he always withheld some food for later consumption,
and he intended to return to finish it. "One of his attorneys had earlier stated that Rector
'thinks he'll be back in his cell on Saturday morning."' Id.
125. U.S. Newswire, June 25,1996.
126. Mark V. Tushnet & Larry Yack!e, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1, 21 (1997).
127. 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)).
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reduce the "thousands upon thousands of frivolous petitions
[that] clog the federal district court dockets. " 128
Whether Clinton's approach to criminals represents the
Democratic position after his presidency, we do not know. If it
does, then the Democrats will have merged their official position
with that of the Court. If not-and we suspect that it does notthen the three-way split will continue with many Republicans
unsatisfied, with some tempted to slip into demagoguery, and
with the Democrats believing that the criminal justice system is
unfairly tilted against the defendant.
C. RACE

1. The Constitution Is Color-Blind: Abraham Lincoln's party
believed it had largely completed its work when it joined Northern Democrats to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act a year later. Those statutes' strong antidiscrimination features 129 combined with a formal rejection of
race-conscious remedies in employment. 130 Despite Goldwater's
negative vote on the Civil Right Act, Republicans had provided
the necessary and overwhelming support to break Southern filibusters against both bills. Nevertheless, the civil rights movement, these laws, and Goldwater's presidential candidacy would
place African-Americans squarely within the Democratic
Party. 131 This, combined with annual summer race riots during
the 1960s, had immediate consequences for Republicans. Driven
by politics, not ideology, they came to be perceived as less supportive of civil rights. Thus the 1968 platform almost completely
ignored race and civil rights, 132 and observers saw Nixon's "law
and order" campaign as explicitly appealing to white voters and
therefore implicitly anti-civil rights.
The move from color-blindness to race-consciousness was
swift, unexpected, and, initially, not much debated. First, the
NAACP intentionally and successfully swamped the Equal Em128. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 44 {Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., 1994).
129. As explained by Hubert Humphrey, the floor leader, discrimination was "a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their different race." 110
CoNG. REC. 5423 {1964). The prohibition on discrimination necessarily barred "preferential treatment for any particular group." /d. at 11,848.
130. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 183-84 (1992); HERMAN
BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 24 {1991); THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS 37 (1983).
131. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 35-36.
132. The sole mention was a boiler-plate statement that the country "must attack the
root causes of poverty and eradicate racism, hatred and violence." 24 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 987 (1968). There was no elaboration.
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ployment Opportunity Commission with Title VII complaints. 133
Case-by-case adjudication of individual cases would take forever
in a workforce where seniority and jobs were entrenched by past
union discrimination. Then, with Nixon's approval, Secretary of
Labor George Shultz established the so-called "Philadelphia
Plan," which required construction unions in greater Philadelphia to set "goals and time tables" for the hiring of AfricanAmericans for craft union jobs. 134 Within a year, the "goals and
time tables" approach 135 was incorporated in regulations governing all federal contractors with greater than fifty employees. 136 A
year later, in Griggs v. Duke Power, 137 the Supreme Court
stripped employers of their ability to set job qualifications not
driven by business necessity if the qualifications had an adverse
disparate impact on minority groups. 138 Griggs was a large step
toward a legal regime in which an employer would have to explain why the racial ratio of its work force did not match that of
the geographical area.
If it seems strange that the Nixon administration rather than
its predecessor was the one that abandoned colorblind nondiscrimination (absent a judicial order), it was. Nevertheless, the
Philadelphia Plan made sense. First, it offered a potential solution to a huge problem of privilege based on racial discrimination. More importantly, it pitted what were then two prime Democratic Party constituencies-organized labor and African
Americans- against each other .139
At virtually the same time, the Nixon administration tried to
slow down the escalating desegregation orders coming in the

133. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 412-14 (1994).
134. Paul Marcus, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Contracts, 17 UCLA L. REV. 817 (1970).
135. "The rate of minority applicants recruited should approximate or equal the rate
of minorities to the applicant population in each location." Department of Labor Order
No.4, as reported in the New York Times, Jan. 16, 1970, at 15.
136. They were required to establish goals and timetables for "underutilization,"
defined as "having fewer minorities or women in a particular job group than would reasonably be expected by their availability." 41 C.F.R. § 60-4.6(b) (2005).
137. 401 u.s. 424 (1971).
138. I d. at 436 (requiring tests to be "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance").
139. According to John Erhlichman, Nixon's chief domestic advisor, "Nixon thought
that Secretary of Labor George Shultz had shown great style in constructing a political
dilemma for labor union leaders and civil rights group.... Before long, the AFL-CIO
and the NAACP were locked in combat over one of the passionate issues of the day and
the Nixon administration was located in the sweet and reasonable middle." EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 98, at 97.
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wake of Green v. New Kent County. 140 Specifically the administration opposed busing as a desegregation tool, and Nixon pub141
licly vowed to "hold busing to the minimum required by law."
Then he led an unsuccessful Republican effort to undo legislatively142 the major busing decision, Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education. 143 Nixon's stand against busing was the key aspect of his strategy to move conservative white
Southern Democrats into their natural ideological home, the
Republican Party. 144 Therefore busing was an issue on which the
Republicans never varied their stance, only the tone of their
rhetoric. They certainly liked the phrase "forced busing." 145
The Republicans favored a race-conscious remedy in employment where past discrimination was by private parties and
was assumed but not proven. The Republicans then opposed
what was thought to be the only effective remedy for public
school desegregation where state laws had previously mandated
discrimination and federal judges had found continuing effects of
that specific unconstitutional action. The inconsistency of the
two positions was ameliorated by how neatly they met the Republicans' political needs. Yet when the Democrats mandated
quotas for delegates to their 1972 convention, Nixon cynically
exploited George Wallace's message by turning on his own administration's affirmative action employment efforts: "When
young people apply for jobs ... and find the door closed because
they don't fit into some numerical quota, despite their ability,
and they object, I do not think it is ri~ht to condemn those young
people as insensitive or even racist." 1 6

140. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
141. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 460-61. When Elliot Richardson, Secretary of
HEW, seemed too supportive of busing decrees, Nixon informed aide John Ehrlichman
"to jump on Richardson and Justice and tell them to Knock off this Crap. I hold them
personally accountable to keep their left.wingers in step with my express policy-Do
what the law requires and not one bit more." !d. (emphasis in original).
142. See JAMES T. PAITERSON, GRAND EXPECfATIONS 733 (19%).
143. 401 u.s. 1 (1971).
144. !d. at 730-31.
145. See, e.g., 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 907 (1976): "We believe segregated schools
are morally wrong and unconstitutional. However, we opposed forced busing to achieve
racial balances in our schools .... If Congress fails to act, we would favor consideration of
an amendment to the Constitution forbidding the assignment of children to schools on
the basis of race." 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 63B (1976): "We must halt forced busing and
get on with the education of all our children." 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT. 2159 (1972):
:·we are committed to guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity and to completIng the process of ending de jure school segregation. At the same time, we are irrevocably
opposed to busing for racial balance."
146. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 637.
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With Bradford Reynolds as the head of the civil rights division of the Reagan Justice Department, the Republicans enshrined their view that "it was impermissible to use policies to
promote groups that might have suffered past discriminationi.e., blacks-arainst the interests of individuals in the presenti.e., whites. " 14 This conclusion took aim at the recent Bakke 148
and Fullilove 149 decisions, which held quotas illegal but nevertheless sustained significant amounts of affirmative action in higher
education and government contracting. Reynolds believed that
the job of government was not to remedy historic patterns of
discrimination; it was to protect individuals from specific acts of
discrimination. AlonR with busing, affirmative action was unconstitutional and out. 0 Rernolds's policies, President Reagan
made clear, were Reagan's. 51
Reagan also wanted to end the Voting Rights Act of 1965
when it expired during his first term, but widewread bipartisan
support forced him to endorse reauthorization. 1 The 1982 Act's
new language on voter dilution, it turned out, offered an irresistible opportunity for "the ultimate political one-night
stand." 153 The Republicans took it. 154 At the urging of strategist
Lee Atwater, the first Bush Justice Department joined with civil
rights groups to demand as many safe black legislative districts
as possible. Affirmative action for black Democratic candidates
diluted the strength of white Democrats, possibly moved some of
them into the Republican Party, and offered the opportunity to
pack Democrats into their own very safe districts. Republicans
knew that the position was inconsistent with their colorblind approach to on all other race issues, 155 but the potential political
147. CARTER, supra note 45, at 56.
148. Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
149. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
150. "I am, most candidly, offended by all forms of discrimination; I regard government tolerance of favoring or disfavoring individuals because of their skin color, sex, religious affiliation or ethnicity to be fundamentally at odds with this country's civil rights
policies." William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 1014.
151. "Mr. Reynolds' civil rights views reflect my own. The policies he pursued are
the policies of this administration, and they remain our policies as long as I am president." Howard Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST, June 28, 1985,
at Al.
152. CARTER, supra note 45, at 58.
153. Jim Sleeper, Rigging the Vote by Race, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1992, at A14 (quoting journalist Peter Brown).
154. Samuel Issacaroff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 45, 54-55.
155. "You don't sell your birthright for a few votes" was the comment of William
Bennett Richard L. Berke, Strategy Divides Top Republicans, N.Y. nMES, May 9, 1991,
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gains in the legislatures were too appealing for principle to prevail.Is6
Surprisingly, after pushing so hard for "max-black" districts,
the Republicans reversed themselves and reverted to arguing for
151
race neutrality in their amicus brief in Shaw v. Reno. The reason for the return to form is not clear. Perhaps it was Atwater's
early death. Perhaps it was the unknown of the Clinton administration's civil rights division. Perhaps it was because the "maxblack" policy did not yield the expected Republican congressional gains in the 1992 elections. For whatever reason, once the
reversion was made, the Republicans had a consistent colorblind
principle on race. But "max-black" in 1994 helped produce the
Republican victory, 158 and the threat to their majority in the 2002
elections prompted Republicans to readopt it in two Southern
states. 159
Then, after the surprising Republican victory in the off-year
elections, incoming Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott launched
into one of his periodic laments that the nation had not followed
Mississippi in backing Strom Thurmond's 1948 Dixiecrat presidential campaign. Reporters and webloggers dug up ample evidence of Lott's affinities for Thurmond's views. To recover, Lott
engaged in "serial, unprincipled apologies" going so far on Black
Entertainment Television as to support affirmative action "absolutely across the board." 160 Democrats and the New York Times
called on the Bush administration to follow Lott's lead and
abandon its beliefs and to cynicall~ support affirmative action
because it's "the right thing" to do. 61 The assertion was that to
cleanse itself of its racist past (and perhaps present), the Republicans should seek absolution by supporting the University of
Michigan in Bollinger. 162 Indeed, delighted by Lott's hoof-inatA7.
156. The Bennett quote in the previous footnote was rejected by the Republican
Party's general counsel with the statement that the Bush Justice Department was just
"carrying out the Voting Rights Act." /d.
157. 509 u.s. 630 (1993).
158. Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 723,725-28 (1995).
159. David E. Rosenbaum, Fight Over Political Map Centers on Race, N.Y. TIMES
Feb. 21, 2002, at A18 (Mississippi); Adam Cohen, Why Republicans Are Shamelessly in
Love with the Voting Rights Act, March 24 2002, §4 at 14 (Georgia).
160. Editorial, Lott and the Race Card, Wall ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at A14.
161. Editorial, Stand Up for Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A30:
"[Lott] sounded cynical under the circumstances, but it was also the right thing to say."
162. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy went so far as to state that the Bush Administration "will have to intervene [as amicus] to uphold" the Michigan program. "This
Week" ABC, Dec. 22, 2002.
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mouth disease, Democratic Senate leader Tom Daschle claimed
that failure to support Michigan "should be viewed as a litmus
test of the administration's commitment to civil rights. " 163
Some Republican operatives also thought that Bush should
support Michigan because of the abysmally small percentage of
the African-American vote he received in 2000 and his need to
court Hispanic voters. 164 Instead, Bush engineered Lott's ouster
as the GOP leader and then filed an amicus brief opposing the
University of Michigan's programs (but not declaring that colleges could never consider race).
The Rehnquist Court itself edged away from Bakke and
Fullilove (as well as Metro Broadcasting165 ) in Croson, 166 Adarand,167 and Shaw v. Reno, 168 but it never went all the way to the
Republican race-neutral position. The Court's stopping point, as
articulated in Easley v. Cromartie 169 and implemented in the
Michigan cases, appears to be that some but not too much use of
race is consistent with the Constitution. 170 Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy gave each minority application 20 out
of 150 possible points (with 100 points guaranteeing admission)
just for applying. 171 Its law school's "holistic" approach ensured
that each class would contain a "'critical mass' of [underrepresented] minorities." 172 Like eight Justices who split evenly on
these cases, the Solicitor General's brief saw no constitutional
difference between Michigan's programs. Justice O'Connor,
however, did. The former was an unconstitutional quota, while
the latter was acceptable at least for a generation. She may have
found a happy compromise because President Bush put the best
face he could on the Administration's defeat by declaring the
opinions "a careful balance" and joined the Court in "look[ing]

163. NeilL. Lewis, Bush and Affirmative Action, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003 at A1,
A24.
164. Jason L. Riley, President Bush Needs to Lead his Party on Race, Wall ST. J., Jan.
16, 2003, at A12; Adam Nagoumey, Bush and Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2003, at A24. Howard Kurtz, Media Notes, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 16,2003.
165. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
166. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
167. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
168. 509 u.s. 630 (1993).
169. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
170. John Hart Ely characterized the Court's position as "indeterminate to the point
of incoherence." Confounded by Cromartie, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496 (2002).
171. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
172. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
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forward to the day when America will truly be a color-blind society. " 173
2. Race-Consciousness Is Essential: If there had been any
doubt about the move of African-Americans to the Democrats
after the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act, Nixon's Southern strategy closed all exits. Furthermore the long-time goal of a
national policy of nondiscrimination was no longer a goal; it was
also the supreme law of the land. New goals were necessary, and
the idea of a color-blind society passed from the scene almost
before the ink was dry on the 1964 and 1965 Acts. Thus when
McLaughlin v. Florida 174 invalidated an interracial cohabitation
law, it marked the last time that the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund offered its heretofore standard citation to the first Justice
Harlan's Plessy dissent for the proposition that the Constitution
was colorblind and race was a constitutional irrelevance. Three
years later, the LDF brief in Loving v. Virginia 175 for the first
time omitted any reference to the Plessy dissent. 176
In the long run, equal opportunities leading to changed results in the work place depended on improved education. Democrats backed the Court's busing decisions. Just as the Republicans condemned busing, the Democrats deemed it essential,
but muted their support in light of busing's unpopularity. 177
The promise of busing to create an integrated society was
undermined by the Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 178 which held
that federal judges lacked the power to change school district
lines and order interdistrict busing. Majority black school districts would therefore remain that way; indeed, they would
probably become increasingly one-race districts. The Court then
seemingly closed the door on judicial creation of the Democratic
ideal of an integrated society in Washington v. Davis, 179 which
held that the disparate impact of laws on African-Americans did
not even require an explanation, let alone make the laws unconstitutional. The combination of the two cases pushed affirmative

173. Split Decisions, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 24,2003, at Al.
174. 378 u.s. 184 (1964.
175. 388 U.S.l (1967).
176. POWE, supra note 51, at 286.
177. 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1728 (1972)(Busing is "another tool.") 32 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 861 (1976) ("It is clearly our responsibility as a party and as citizens to support
the principles of our Constitution.") 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC lOOB (1980) ("Mandatory
transportation ... remains a judicial tool of last resort.").
178. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
179. 428 u.s. 153 (1976).
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action to the fore as the remaining way to achieve an integrated
society.
African-Americans were Democrats, very loyal ones, and
therefore the Democrats were committed to race-conscious
remedies. The limit seemed to be quotas, a poisonous word for
another Democratic constituency, Jews, and an end that everyone found objectionable during the debates on the Civil Rights
Act. 180 "By 1969, the bipartisan consensus on which the Civil
Rights Act rested had collapsed, and civil rights was a bitterly
partisan issue. The Democratic party ... [t]rying to retain the
support of organized labor and middle class opinion . . . concealed and obfuscated its growing commitment to race conscious
remedies." 181 Mention of quotas was forbidden.
Then in 1972 in a stunning and politically disastrous 182
move, the Democrats required quotas for delegates to their 1972
convention. Racial and gender quotas were mandatory. Oneresult was to unseat Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago delegation. 183
George McGovern tried to escape this issue with an unequivocal
"rejectMon of] the quota system as detrimental to American society." 4
Unfortunately for African-Americans, strident Republican
opposition to abortion drove many affluent voters into the Democratic Party, and the Democrats' economic agenda became
less progressive. 185 As a result, Democrats would grant AfricanAmericans all kinds of affirmative action, but what the Democrats would not offer was more money for social programs. In the
process the Democrats became completely wedded to aggressive
affirmative action as "an essential component of our commitment to expanding civil rights protection." 186 Jesse Jackson's
1984 candidacy drove the party to candor that almost encom180. See BELZ, supra note 130, at 24. "The sponsors of Title VII unequivocally rejected the view that it was in any way intended or capable of being interpreted to promote race-conscious preferential practices."
181. !d. at 34.
182. !d. at 94 ("When millions of Americans saw delegates on television who had
been selected according to strict affirmative action rules, it stimulated fears that jobs and
education would also be apportioned on the basis of quotas rather than merit.").
183. PATI'ERSON, supra note 142, at 760.
184. Editorial, The Quota Controversy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1972, at 9.
185. MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION 133 (1996) ("As the Democratic
Party becomes a better vehicle for pursuing the liberal abortion policies favored by most
affluent Americans, that party has become a worse vehicle for pursuing the liberal redistributive policies favored by less affluent Americans.").
186. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1058 (1980). One might well substitute "only" for "essential."
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passed using the forbidden term quota: "The Party reaffirms its
longstanding commitment to the eradication of discrimination in
all aspects of American life through the use of affirmative action,
goals, timetables, and other verifiable measurements to overturn
historic patterns and historic burdens of discrimination." 187
With Bill Clinton, the Democrats for the first time had an
administration fully supportive of affirmative action, right down
to quotas in the Cabinet. 188 Furthermore, in Deval Patrick, Clinton's second choice to head the Civil Rights Division, Clinton
had the exact opposite of Reagan's Bradford Reynolds. Whereas
Reynolds could not find an affirmative action plan he could tolerate, Patrick could not find one that went too far. Patrick won
an intramural battle to intervene in Taxman v. Piscataway,
where a white teacher was dismissed in favor of an AfricanAmerican teacher with identical seniority because budget cuts
required one to go. What made Taxman particularly unappealing as a vehicle to sustain affirmative action was that the Piscataway High School already had double the requisite percentage of African-American teachers. 189 Then, after the California
voters adopted Proposition 209 with its anti-discrimination language,190 Clinton's spokesman Mike McCurry told reporters that
the President was following the issue "very carefully" and agreed
with the Justice Department and a district court judge 191 that it
was unconstitutional. 192 President Clinton then ordered the Justice Department to intervene on behalf of a challenge to the voters' right to end affirmative action. 193

187. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 92B (1984).
188. "A Cabinet that looks like America" had the requisite 70 percent attorneys.
189. The school's rationale for dismissing Sharon Taxman was that "diversity" was
essential not only in the high school as a whole, but in each department as well. Supporters of affirmative action breathed a national sigh of relief when Taxman was bought out
after the Court granted certiorari. 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
190. Cal. Canst. Art. 1, §31(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.").
191. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
192. David Tell, Sophistry and Affirmative Action, The WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 3,
1997, at 9. At a time when Adarand made it arguable that all of California's programs
were unconstitutional, a judge ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the
California voters from discontinuing them, and Clinton and his Justice Department
thought so, too.
193. Michael Kelly, Breach of Promise, The NEW REPUBLIC, April 28, 1997 at 4. The
intervention did not help the challengers as the Ninth Circuit reversed. Coalition for
Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th 1997).
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The 1994 election changed the politics of affirmative action
by giving the Republicans control of both houses of Congress
and therefore the first chance legislatively to implement their
views. Nevertheless, a Clinton veto could have negated their less
than supermajority. As it happened, however, Adarand changed
the landscape by moving executive action to the foreground
while the legislature watched. Clinton offered "mend it, don't
end it," a thorough reanalysis by the Civil Rights Division of
federal affirmative action programs.
Clinton's support for affirmative action foreshadowed the
outcome of the review. Essentially "mending" it meant eliminating only gratuitous discrimination against whites.
It does not mean-and I don't favor-the unjustified prefer-

ence of the unqualified over the qualified of any race or gender. It doesn't mean-and I don't favor-numerical quotas. It
doesn't mean-and I don't favor-rejection or selection of
any employee or student solely on the basis of race or gender
without regard to merit." 194

Not surprisingly, only token corrections were necessary to
"mend it," and "ending it" was never considered. Yet when even
Ronald Dworkin acknowledged that "unless the court changes
direction, affirmative action is finished as a means of securing
racial diversity in industry or business," 195 the Clinton administration's tenacity was an extraordinary testament to the Democrats' commitment to race consciousness.
D. ABORTION
1. Roe Must Go: When abortion emerged as a political issue, it recognized no party lines. 196 Robert Packwood introduced
legislation both to create a national right to abortion 197 and to
liberalize the District of Columbia's law. 198 Nelson Rockefeller

194. THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 28, 1997 at 4. This was, however, movement from
the Justice Department's position in Taxman.
195. Ronald Dworkin, Race and the Uses of Law, NEW YORK TIMES, April13, 2001,
at A19.
196. Thus one of the initial votes on the Hyde Amendment to prevent funding of
abortions had the following divisions in the House (with the negatives in the majority):
Republicans 98-70, northern Democrats 96-35, southern Democrats 53-18. 30 CoNG. Q.
ALMANAC, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 76-H (1974)
197. The National Abortion Act would "guarantee and protect" the "fundamental
constitutional right" of a woman to "control her own fertility." S. 3746,91 Cong. 2d Sess.
(1970).
198. S. 3501, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
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presided over the legalization of abortion in New York. 199
George McGovern was mildly pro-abortion. 200 Republicans were
the leaders on both sides in the congressional battles of the
1970s.201 With "elites in both parties favoring legal abortion, the
elite Justices on the Supreme Court proved quite sympathetic to
the claims that women had a constitutional right to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy. "202
Although some commentators expected Roe to settle the
abortion controversy, Roe instead moved a state issue into national politics, where neither party was ready to deal with it. 203
While both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter felt that Roe had
gone too far, abortion was peripheral to the 1976 campaign. Four
years later, George Bush ran for the presidency with an identical
position in a changed political landscape: no federal fundin~ of
abortion and no constitutional amendments to roll back Roe.
In both legalizing and politicizing abortion, Roe managed
simultaneously to create its own opposition205 as well as to cause
its supporters to demobilize (at least partially)/06 thereby yielding the offense to its opponents, initially led by the Catholic
Church. 207 Henry Hyde offered the first successful assault on Roe
with his amendment prohibiting the federal funding of abortions.
The votes on the Hyde Amendment indicated strong Republican
support in the House with Democrats more evenly split. 208 But
199. In 1970 New York adopted a law legalizing all abortions in the first twenty-four
weeks of a woman's pregnancy. See BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 42, 74 (1993).
200. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Sept. 7, 1972 at 2222. (Abortion was "a private matter
which should be decided by a pregnant woman and her own doctor" while inconsistently
also stating abortion was "a matter to be left to state governments.") Following Hubert
H. Humphrey's lead in California primary against McGovern, Republicans referred to
McGovern as the "triple A" candidate: "Abortion, Acid, Amnesty." PAlTERSON, supra
note 142, at 759.
201. CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 117.
202. GRABER, supra note 185, at 153.
203. In their platform Republicans conceded the issue of abortion was "one of the
most difficult and controversial of our time." They protested the Court's "intrusion into
the family structure" and supported a constitutional amendment. They also called for a
"public dialogue" on the issue. Republican Party Platform, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.,
Aug. 21, 1976, at 2298. The Democratic Party Platform "fully recognize[d] the religious
and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., July 17,1976, at 1918.
204. CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 165.
205. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 182-89 (1991).
206. GRABER, supra note 185, at 126.
207. CRAIG & O'BRIEN,supra note 199, at 43-45.
208. The Senate votes reflected less ;:nthusiasm against Roe by both parties, but the
Senate could only force compromise language upon the House.
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the votes may have been misleading as abortion supporters did
not fight as hard as they might have because they were confident
that any legislative defeats would be erased in the judiciary. 209
Roe also coincided with the social and political strengthening of "born again" Christians. By the end of the 1970s, opposition to Roe took on a conservative cast and placed itself squarely
into the Republican Party, where it found a champion in Ronald
Reagan. The former California ~overnor had signed a liberalization law in California in 196721 but ran as a firm antiabortion
candidate in 1976 and even more so in his successful1980 bid for
the Republican nomination, when he labeled Roe "an abuse of
power as bad as the transgressions of Watergate and the bribery
on Capital Hill." 211 On securing the nomination, Reagan brought
the Republican Party fully to an anti-Roe position from which
Republicans have not retreated. 212 In 1988, the second time
George Bush ran for the presidenc:X, his position, like that of
Reagan, was solidli 13 antiabortion. 14 George W. Bush, at the
beginning of his administration, reinstated Ronald Reagan's executive order (which Bill Clinton repealed) prohibiting United
States funding of international agencies that subsidize abortion.215
The Reagan administration moved well beyond the denials
of federal funding 216 that had previously represented a popular
209. See GRABER, supra note 185, at 121-22. Furthermore, prominent pro-choice
groups like the National Abortion Rights Action League, Planned Parenthood Federation, the National Organization for Women, and the American Civil Liberties Union
were organizations with strong legal staffs and central offices and had a natural bias favoring litigation over politics. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 199.
210. ROSENBERG, supra note 205, at 268.
211. Byron W. Daynes & Raymond Tatalovich, Presidential Politics and Abortion,
1972-1988,22 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 545,549 (1992) (quoting Reagan).
212. The plank in the Republican platform on abortion always "reaffirms" the
party's "support" for a constitutional amendment overturning Roe. There is a helpful
comparison of the two parties' platforms on abortion in CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note
199, at 166-68.
213. Graber calls it "rabidly" pro-life. Graber, supra note 185, at 140.
214. "After years of sober and serious reflection on the issue, I think the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe was wrong and should be overturned ... I promise the president
hears you now and stands with you in a cause that must be won." Laura Sessions Stepp
and Ann Devroy, Bush Cites Abortion 'Tragedy' in Call to 67,000 Protesters, WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al.
215. 66 FED. REG. 3878 (2001). Network news coverage of the Clinton and Bush actions was scrupulously fair. Peter Jennings on ABC reported that Clinton had "kept his
word on abortion rights." Bush was "taking a hard line." Tom Brokaw of NBC agreed
that Clinton had "kept the campaign promise" while Bush's action was "controversial."
Dan Rather on CBS concluded that Bush had acted to "please the right flank of his
party." National Public Radio, "Morning Edition," February 1, 2<!01.
216. Funding cut-offs to poor women not only were constitutional, see Maher v. Roe,
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nibbling at Roe. 217 By 1983, the Justice Department made the
overruling of Roe goal number one. While awaiting that happy
day, but finding it a little far off, the Administration showed its
devotion to "life" by proposing "Baby Jane Doe" regulations
that would have imposed upon hospitals, doctors, and parents
the duty to save newborns with the severest birth defects
through their last possible painful dying breath. 218
The judicial battle over Roe commenced with a pattern of
stacking the lower federal courts with judges opposed to abortion219 -so much so that a charitable contribution to Planned
Parenthood was disqualifying. 220 Then the Justice Department
applied the same standard at the Supreme Court, with two conservatives from the D.C. Circuit, Antonin Scalia and then
Robert Bork. Scalia sailed through a Republican Senate as the
Democrats misfired at the elevation of Rehnquist to Chief Justice.221 Bork, however, faced a newly Democratic Senate, and
from the time Reagan nominated Bork until Bill Clinton defeated Bush, the abortion battle was played out at the Supreme
Court, either in litigation or with efforts to find the ever-elusive
fifth vote to kill Roe.
The hearings on Bork's nomination-the "borking of
Bork"- gave the entire nation a basic and easily understood lesson in Legal Realism 101. 222 The Constitution protected a right
to an abortion. No Article V changes in the Constitution were
possible. If Bork were confirmed, then the Constitution would
change and not protect a right to an abortion. Therefore, we are
432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), they did not affect the most
ardent supporters of abortion, affluent women. See GRABER, supra note 185, at 126, 13637.
217. "The Republican Senate rolled over its moderate leadership ... and approved
the strongest anti-abortion provisions Congress has ever passed." Helen Dewa, Toughest
Curbs on Abortion Funds Voted by Senate, WASH. POST, May 22, 1981, at Al. The House
was always more antiabortion than the Senate.
218. 49 FED. REG. 1622 (1984).
219. The 1980 Republican Party Platform demanded "the appointment of judges at
all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., July 19, 1980, at 2046. "Innocent human life"
was anti-abortion code for the unborn.
220. Andrew Frey, a deputy Solicitor General, had his nomination withdrawn-at
the behest of thirteen Senators-on this basis. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at
175. See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING F'EDERALJUDGES (1997).
221. L.A. Powe, Jr., From Bark to Souter, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 784-85
(1991).
222. Bark: a verb, gerund, or noun. To bark is to use character assassination and
gro~s dist~rtions against a nominee whose position on the only issue worth caring about
IS d1ame~ncally opp~sed to the barker and has the likelihood of prevailing. Barkers justify borkmg on the highest principle: that the end justifies the means.
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(at least in part) a government of men and not of laws. Republicans overwhelmingly backed Bork, but the Senate was Democratic.223
The defeat of Bork did not lessen Reagan's and (perhaps)
Bush's desire to undo Roe. It demanded a different strategy, one
that played out with David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Besides being Republicans, their attraction was that neither had a
so-called "paper trail." Souter, "the stealth candidate,"224 was so
obscure that no one had heard of him. Thomas was better
known, having been in the Reagan administration before going
on the D.C. Circuit,225 but he claimed never to have debated Roe
in his life.226 With no paper trail, too man~ Democrats believed
there was no le~timate reason to vote no. 2 7 Republicans needed
no convincing. 2
Republicans were outraged when Souter (and Kennedy)
joined O'Connor in the conclusion that Roe was too politically
divisive to overrule and therefore everyone should cease debating the issue. 229 The half a loaf ceded-that regulations not unreasonably burdensome on the core right to an abortion were
valid-was just not enough. Not only had the Court-packing
strategy for overruling Roe failed, it had come to a forced ending
with the Clinton election, so much so that after two further Supreme Court appointments even the procedure labeled by antiabortion activists as "partial birth abortion" could not be
223. Republicans voted 40-6 to confirm, but were overwhelmed by a solid Democratic vote, 52-2 to reject (David Boren of Oklahoma and Ernest Hollings of South Carolina).
224. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 214 (quoting Sen. Howell Heflin's description).
225. Before going on the D.C. Qrcuit, Thomas had been head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Like the Republican Party generally, he opposed
race-based remedies, except where the specific individual had been discriminated against
by the defendant.
226. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 102nd
Cong. 1st. Sess. J-102-40 at 1450-51 (1991). Critics suggested that Thomas was either lying or incompetent (or perhaps both). It turns out that he was giving a "very Clintonesque" answer. William Branford Reynolds states: "I know we discussed it. I think
that he thought little of Roe v. Wade.... From a scholarly standpoint, we were talking
about constitutional law, constitutional issues, and Supreme Court decisions. It was clear
he didn't think much of it." ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS 246 (2001)
(quoting Reynolds).
227. Democrats supplied 46 of the 48 negatives with eleven voting for Thomas. One
of the 11, Richard Shelby of Alabama, subsequently switched parties. Anita Hill's allegations about sexual advances (in the climate of 1991 and the fact that Thomas had been at
the EEOC at the time of the advances) supplied the legitimate reason for opposing him.
228. Republicans voted 41-to 2 to confirm. Robert Packwood of Oregon and James
Jeffords of Vermont voted against Thomas. Jeffords left the Republican Party in 2001.
229. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865--69.
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banned. 230 At best, the overruling of Roe could be revived as a
hope and threat every fourth year.
Republicans also knew that the electorate agreed with Casey: restrict abortions, but keep them legal. 231 Both as governor
and as presidential candidate, George W. Bush acknowledged
his party's platform calling for an amendment to ban abortions
and brushed it aside as having no chance of passage. Although
he would not pledge to appoint only antiabortion Justices to the
Court,232 he gave no indication that he wouldn't, especially when
he called attention to the fact that his favorite Justices were
Scalia and Thomas. His controversial nominees to the courts of
appeals signal that he will nominate only pro-life Justices to the
Court. Nevertheless, neither John Roberts nor Samuel Alito,
while pro-life, could definitively be placed in the anti-Rae camp.
2. Choice Without Restrictions: The Democratic position on
abortion jelled in response to the Republicans. The votes on the
Hyde Amendment had shown that northern Democrats with
minimal Catholic constituencies were solidly in favor of abortion. And the pro-litigation bias of abortion proponents, with its
implicit offer of a legislative pass as necessary, undoubtedly
masked some latent Democratic support for Roe. But Reagan's
assault on Roe solidified the Democrats. 233 Their 1980 platform
"fully recognized the religious and ethical concerns" Americans
had about abortion, but supported Roe as the "law of the
land." 234 Four years later, the agonizing was gone. Reproductive
freedom was "a fundamental human right," and Democrats opposed any "interference," especially a "lack of funding for
poorer women. "235 The language thereafter changed a bit, but
reproductive choice was always so "fundamental" that it should

230. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
231. "[Casey] was the perfect ruling. The Court basically came out where the American people are, [that is) abortion should remain legal, but reasonable restrictions can ap·
ply." WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT 149 (2003) (quoting ABC reporter Cokie
Roberts). "[T]hat's the kind of approach that the public opinion polls say the voters
like .... So the Justices ... may have come down just about where the country is on this
one." /d. (quoting CBS reporter Bruce Morton).
232. /d. at 248, 251
233. GRABER, supra note 185, at 137-38 ("The Democratic Party adopted much stronger
pro-choice positions during the 1980s than during the 1970s. As a result, that coalition lost the
alle~iance of some strongly pro-life New Dealers, but it attracted some strongly prochmce voters who formerly had supported GOP candidates.).
234. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 97B (1980).
235. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 93B (1984).
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be available without regard for ability to pay regardless of what
the Court had concluded. 236
The Democrats' shift can be perfectly seen in Al Gore,
whose moves were the mirror opposite of the elder Bush. 237 As a
congressman, Gore talked the talk and voted the vote of the antiabortion movement. 238 As a Senator running for President in
1988, he was firmly pro-choice. After eight years as VicePresident, he denied he had ever been anything but a fan of
Roe. 239 But a Democrat must be even more. Thus Gore "seized
on the close vote in Stenberg v. Carhart [to preclude banning socalled partial birth abortions] to warn that Mr. Bush, if elected,
would appoint conservative Supreme Court Justices hostile to
abortion rights. " 240
Thus by the mid-1980s, "the national Democratic and Republican parties offered voters a clear choice on abortion. "241
After the defeat of Bork, the Democrats remained worried
about Supreme Court appointees, but Casey and Clinton's 1992
win enabled the Democrats to survive the Republican surge. Or
so everyone thought until the 1994 Republican upset. Thereafter
the Democrats had to play serious defense, which they did by
adopting the joint playbooks of the National Rifle Association
and the American Civil Liberties Union. They opposed any laws,
no matter how reasonable, that restricted abortions. The reasoning, like that of the NRA and ACLU, was quite simple. They did
not want to give their opponents any legislative victories that
might offer even the slightest encouragement. They did not want
a single wedge that could lead to further judicial weakening of
236. See CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 199, at 167--{i8.
237. Richard Gephardt is an equally illustrative example. On January 21, 2003, all
the 2004 Democratic presidential hopefuls swore fealty to Roe, and the most interesting
was Gephardt, who had been pro-life during his first decade in the House, but who ex·
plained to the audience how he had changed on the issue by coming to understand the
wisdom of the pro-choice position. He did not mention that this nicely coincided with his
first attempt at the presidency in 1988. Adam Nagoumey, In Turn, 6 Presidential Hopefuls Back Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,2003, at A17.
238. "What is clear from a review of his public statements on the issue and the votes
he cast in Congress is that the vice president's position on abortion has changed over the
trajectory of his political career. And it was not a small shift: in the early 1980's, when
Mr. Gore was representing middle Tennessee in the House, the National Right to Life
Committee said he had voted in line with the group's views 84 percent of the time."
Robin Toner, Shifting Views over Abortion Fog Gore, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at Al.
239. Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Abortion Stance Evolved, Gore Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al4.
240. Jim Yardley, AI Gore Claims Bush Would Appoint Anti-Abortion Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2000, at Al.
241. GRABER, supra note 185, at 138.
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the constitutional right. Thus President Clinton vetoed the socalled partial birth abortion laws each time Congress presented
them to him/ 42 and Democratic votes sustained the vetoes. 243
And when congressional Republicans in 2001 again 244 introduced
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, a bill imposing penalties on
people who harm a fetus during an assault on a pregnant women,
Democrats voiced displeasure, even though the bill protected a
woman's right to choose. 245 Their votes followed their objections.246 No one noted the irony that Democrats would have
happily protected the woman if she were not pregnant, while the
Republicans would not have because the crime would have been
a state issue. The 2004 version of the bill, now known as the Laci
Peterson Law47 after the eight-months pregnant woman who
was murdered Christmas Eve 2002, was highlighted in a
Bush/Cheney ad called "Values." The ad noted that although
John Kerry had missed two-thirds of all Senate votes while campaigning, he was present to vote "no" on this law. 248
This has been matched by executive orders (in limited
cases) defining "child" and "fetus." President Clinton proposed
a definition of "fetus" as "the product of conception during
pregnancl until a determination is made after delivery that it is
viable." 24 President Bush, in turn, authored expansion of prenatal care by labeling the fetus an unborn child. 250

242. See H.R. 1833, 32 Weekly Comp. 645 (1996); H.R. 1122, 33 Weekly Comp. 1545
(1997).
243. In 1997 House Democrats voted 127-77 to support the ban, but the House Republican vote of 218-8 was enough for an override. The Senate, however, could not override, with Democrats providing 32 of the 36 negative votes (and only 13 affirmative
(Southerners, Catholics, and those representing substantial Catholic populations): Biden,
Breaux, Byrd, Conrad, Daschele, Dorgan, Ford, Hollings, Johnson, Landrieu, Leahy,
Moynihan, and Reid. 1144 CONG. REC. 896 (1998).
244. It had passed the House in the previous Congress, but the Senate took no action
because there were not the votes to override the automatic Clinton veto.
245. Juliet Eilpcrin, House GOP Pushes New Abortion Limits, WASH. POST, March
16, 2001, at A1 (quoting Rep. Jerrold Nadler): "[the] real purpose is to establish a doctrine, contrary to the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, that the fetus is a separate
person. This is driven by the politics of abortion rather than the substantive effort to fight
violence against women."
246. Republicans provided 198 of the 252 ayes; Democrats, 150 of the 172 negatives.
Alison Mitchell, House Approves Bill Criminalizing Violence to Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, April
27,2001, at Al.
247. The official name is the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004." Pub. L. No.
108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
248. The Senate vote was 61-38. The only prominent Democrat to vote yes was Tom
Daschle, who was up for reelection.
249. 66 FED. REG. 3879 (2001).
250. 67 FED. REG. 61,956 (2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 457).
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The issues the Democrats could never win were government
funding for low-income abortions, preventing parental notification laws, and finally the procedure opponents described as partial birth abortion. Without a Democrat in the White House to
veto a procedure viewed even by some Democrats as morally
repugnant/ 51 Senate Democratic leader Thomas Daschle concluded that it was time to move the matter out of Congress and
into the courts. 252
Democrats rna~ have yielded on the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003/ but not on their support for Roe. In the
twenty years following the Carter presidency, not a single prolife Democrat made a dent in the presidential derby. Congressman Dennis Kucinich had a zero rating from the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League in 2000. Running
for President in 2003, he proposed a litmus test of support for
Roe without so much as missing a beat. 254 The Democrats' fealty
on the issue ran so deep that Pennsylvania governor Robert Casey was not even allowed to speak at the 1992 convention because of his pro-life position. 255
E. RELIGION
1. Pledging in Public: Prior to Roe, no case ~roduced a bigger flood of hostile mail than Engel v. Vitale. 56 Engel came
without warning and was met with a huge public outcry. 257 It
drew an immediate effort by Congressman Frank Becker, a
Catholic Republican from New York, supported by Southern
Democrats and Midwestern Republicans, to overturn it via a
constitutional amendment. Interestingly, those Protestants most
hostile to Engel and the next year's addition, Schempp, 258 -

251. Kate Michelman, president of Naral Pro-Choice, lamented that the Republicans
"ran away with this debate in the public domain by constantly describing this procedure."
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, BiU Barring Abortion Procedure Drew Big Backing from Many
Friends of Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A16. An earlier statement by
Senator Rick Santorum showed how effective antiabortion rhetoric could be: "There
may be a medical need to terminate a pregnancy, but there is never a need to kill a
baby." SALETAN, supra note 231, at 234.
252. Stolberg, supra note 251, at A16
253. Pub.L. No. 108-105,117 Stat. 1201 (2003).
254. William Sale tan, Early Labor, SLATE. COM, May 19, 2003.
255. Walter Goodman, The Convention Images, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at 48.
256. 370 u.s. 421 (1962).
257. See POWE, supra note 51, at 187-89. Earl Warren recalled a headline proclaiming that "Court outlaws God." MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 316 (1977).
258. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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fundamentalists, evangelicals, Pentecostals, and charismatics259 sat out this political issue, like all others. 260 As Jerry Falwell explained in 1965, "We pay our taxes, cast our votes as a responsibility of citizenship, obey the laws of the land, and other things
demanded of us by the society in which we live. But at the same
time we are cognizant that our only pur~ose on this earth is to
know Christ and to make him known." 61 Instead, at hearings
that House Judiciary Chair Emanuel Celler reluctantly called, a
veritable "who's who" of organized Protestant denominations
lined up to argue against any modification of the establishment
clause, and supporters of the proposal knew it was dead? 62
Prayer in schools was not, however, as the Court's decisions
were widely and publicly ignored in both the South and Midwest.263 School prayer has always been more popular with voters
than with members of Congress. Verball~ supporting it is both
easy and cheap, and the Republicans did. 64 Amending the Constitution is something else altogether, and a prayer amendment
never saw a vote.
Prayer reappeared as a political issue when the evangelicals
came out of their self-imposed exile and entered into electoral
politics at the end of the 1970s.265 They were disgusted by the
moral decline of the country on the one hand266 and were at259. These Protestants are often labeled as the Religious or Christian Right, typically by people who have never referred to the Christian Left. For simplicity's sake, we
will call them evangelicals.
260. "Evangelicals concentrate on conversion, and except for occasional efforts to
outlaw what they deem to be personal vices, evangelical Protestant groups largely ignore
social and political efforts at reform." Robert Wuthnow, Political Rebinh of American
Evangelicalism, in THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT 168 (Robert C. Liebman and Robert
Wuthnow eds., 1983).
261. A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 316 (1985).
262. The National Council of Churches, the Baptists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Seventh-Day Adventists, Unitarians, and the United Church of Christ opposed any amendment, and the legal department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference advised
Catholics to be "very cautious" in supporting any amendment. See POWE, supra note 51,
at 362.
263. See generally KENNETii DOLBEARE & PHILIP HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL
PRAYER DECISIONS (1971).
264. 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2166 (1972): "We reaffirm our view that voluntary
prayer should be freely permitted in public places-particularly, by school children while
attending public schools." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 9fJ7 (1976): "Local communities wishing to conduct non-sectarian prayers in their public schools should be able to do so."
265. One "bemused" evangelical noted of a Reagan rally, "(t]housands of people
were cheering for all they were worth-cheering away the eschatological doctrines of a
lifetime, cheering away the theological pessimism of a lifetime." REICHLEY, supra note
261, at 322-23.
266. See id., at 316--17. Charles Cade, the first operations director of the Moral Majority, chose this indelicate way of putting it: "Abortion, pornography, homosexualitythose are hard for the average Christians to relate to. They don't read Playboy, their
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tracted to the 1976 presidential campaign of one of their own,
Jimmy Carter, on the other. 267 But the catalyst came when
Carter's Internal Revenue Service switched enforcement polifls
on the tax-exempt status of their all-white Christian schools. 2 8
Carter had done nothing on issues evangelicals cared about, and
the Republicans promised they would. In Reagan, the Republicans offered a candidate who claimed to care, and the evangelicals flocked to his banner269 and to a party specifically willing to
invoke its faith in God. 270
Using rights-based language usually associated with Democrats, Republicans called on "Congress to restore the right of individuals to participate in voluntary non-denominational prayer
in schools and other public facilities. " 271 The shift to rights-based
rhetoric was important. "Mindful of our religious diversity, we
reaffirm our commitment to the freedoms of religion and speech
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and firmly
support the rights of students to openly practice the same, including the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools. "272
Students could worship Karl Marx, they said; why was there not
an equal right to pray to their God? The answer was either "coercion" or Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation" between church and state, or both. To the former, the Republicans
emphasized the "voluntary" nature of any prayer. 273 To the latter, Republicans adopted the positions Potter Stewart had taken
dissenting in the prayer cases: 274 that the real issue was one of
daughters aren't pregnant, and they don't know any queers." MATIHEW C. MOEN, THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND CONGRESS 3 (1989).
267. REICHLEY, supra note 261, at 318 ("Without making much public effort, Carter
attracted widespread support from evangelicals and fundamentalists, who regarded him
somewhat as Catholics had regarded John Kennedy in 1960.")
268. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 98, at 131-32. Falwell noted that "[i]t was the
IRS trying to take away our tax exemptions that made us realize we had to fight for our
lives." MOEN, supra note 263, at 27. The tax-exempt status of Christian schools had been
problematical, at best, since 1970, but the IRS had never challenged the schools' status.
Id. at 26.
269. See REICHLEY, supra note 261, at 318-27.
270. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 59B (1980) ("With God's help, let us now, together
make America great again."); 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 46A (1992) ("free men and
women, with faith in God").
271. 36 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 63B (1984). This is an interesting linguistic switch from
the 1976 platform, which called for a constitutional amendment. See 32 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 907 (1976).
272. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC SOB (1984).
273. The emphasis on voluntariness was a shift from the 1976 platform which did not
mention the word: "Local communities wishing to conduct non-sectarian prayers in their
public schools should be able to do so." 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 907 (1976).
274. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444 (dissenting); Abingdon School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,308 (dissenting).
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free exercise rather than establishment, and the free exercise
claim trumped. With prayer resting on the rights of individuals
to engage in the free exercise of religion, Republican analysis
left the establishment clause in the dust.
Even in his confusion during his first debate with Walter
Mondale, President Reagan could state the Republican view of
the intertwining of the two clauses:
[Some want] to hinder that part of the Constitution that says
the government shall not only not establish a religion, it shall
not inhibit the practice of religion. And they have been using
these things to have government, through court orders, inhibit
the practice of religion. A child wants to say grace in the
275
school cafeteria, and a court rules that they can't do it.

The main success of the free exercise strategy came after
Democrats defeated a voluntary prayer amendment. 276 Realizing, albeit belatedly, that simple access to schools could accomplish much the same thing, Republicans took the legislative way
and routed the Democrats who couldn't find a way to come out
against rights-based equality. 277 The Equal Access Act of 1984278
extended Widmar v. Vincent's 279 holding that colleges must treat
student religious groups who wished to use campus meeting
rooms equally with nonreligious ones and applied it to secondary
(but not elementary) schools.
Reagan's electoral strength never extended to bring in Republicans to the House, and the Equal Access Act was a onetime legislative victory. 280 After the 1982 elections/ 81 efforts
275. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 111B (1984).
276. The story is best told in ALLEN D. HERTZKE, REPRESENTING Goo IN
WASHINGTON 167-94 (1988). The Senate Judiciary Committee also reported out a silent
prayer amendment, S. Rep. 99-165, but no amendment is necessary for that and it died
without a vote because of lack of enthusiasm. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS 452 (1996).
277. The Washington Post, perhaps speaking for the silent Democrats, ran six editorials against what it called the "Son of School Prayer." /d. at 169.
278. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984).
279. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
280. The only other religion-related statute that Congress passed was a bill forbidding the Justice Department to take action against schools that allowed silent prayer.
Since the Reagan Justice Department had no such intention, this Democratic sponsored
piece of legislation was entirely symbolic. See MOEN, supra note 266, at 97. Tuition tax
credits failed.
281. The Democrats gained 26 seats and changed the composition of the Judiciary
Committee from a Democratic margin of 16-12 to 20-11. /d. at 111. Even Reagan's 1984
landslide victory netted only 17 new Republican House members and a loss of two Senate seats. In 1986 the Democrats gained eight more seats in the Senate to retake control.
See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY 646, 657 (1989).
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quickly Earalleled those aiming at Rae-change through the judiciary.2 2 The Justice Department's vetting of potential judicial
nominees is well-known. What is less known is that beginning
with the 1982 Term, the Solicitor General began to file amicus
briefs urging a doctrinal move to accommodation in all establishment clause cases.283 The Republicans achieved some modest
results in the mid-1980s as the Court relaxed opposition to aid to
religious schools, 284 approved payments to a legislative chaplain,285 and sustained a municipal Christmas-is-the-time-to-shop
nativity scene. 286
At this point, the parallels between abortion and prayer
converge to a single story through the first Bush administration.
Although nothing logically requires these results, Justices who
support Roe also support a strong separationist position,287
whereas Justices who would overturn Roe turn out to be quite
antiseparationist. 288 Justices striving for middle ground, such as
O'Connor and Kennedy, find both some restrictions on abortion
and some accommodation of religion consistent with the underlying constitutional principles. Thus it appears that knowing a
nominee's views on either of these issues provides a window to
the other. 289 But for Republicans it is still a tough prediction because they lack good nonlegal surrogates for public views on the
two issues. Nominating a Catholic would work; fundamentalist
or evangelical lawyers with the requisite stature are harder to
find? 90 Democrats have easy predictive surrogates. Select either
a (non-Orthodox) Jew or someone who is not religious. Indeed,
for Democrats the only true risk is picking a Catholic.
In this respect, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder's hysterical reaction to the nomination of Clarence Thomas is instructive.
Conceding that Thomas was qualified to sit on the Court, Wilder
282. STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 206.
283. The change came between lArkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) during
the 1981 Term and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) which were argued in April1983. By the start of the next Term, the Justice Department had blessed the Court with its views "on more than half of the 113 cases
already set for argument." STEPHENSON, supra note 1, at 206.
284. 463 u.s. 388.
285. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783.
286. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668.
287. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and now Breyer and Ginsburg.
288. Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas.
289. Justice Souter may or may not fit this mold, although a good bet may be that if
his Establishment Oause position holds, he will become more supportive of Roe.
290. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft probably has the stature but would be
unconfirmable.
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nevertheless pronounced his "devout" Catholicism as the issue.
"The ~uestion is: How much allegiance does he have to the
Pope?" 91 This was hardly the wisest statement for the first African-American to be given a serious chance to win the Democratic presidential nomination (for unlike Jesse Jackson, Wilder
drew considerable white support). Not only was the remark bigoted, it was ignorant. Thomas was divorced, remarried, and was
attending an Episcopal church. 292 To his credit, Wilder quickly
recanted. 293 There were no similar comments with the nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito.
Republicans continued to woo successfully the religious
right into their electoral base. Apart from rhetoric, however,
they did little to promote an accomodationist view of religion as
a matter of policy. Republican support for tuition tax credits,
and later for school vouchers, implicated the establishment
clause and were popular among evangelicals, but those issues
and their politics were about much more than religion. The
Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris294 puts the establishment clause objections largely to rest because the majority
opinion offers an easy roadmap for a constitutional program. Future battles over vouchers will be fought on their (educational)
merits, and the teachers unions (and therefore the Democrats)
will be vocal in opposition.
Then came George W. Bush with a centerpiece of his campaign being his plan to encourage "faith-based initiatives," to
help solve social problems. After the inauguration, rhetoric
turned to reality when he issued an executive order creating an
"Office of Faith-Based and Community lnitiatives."295 After
September 11, however, the Bush administration bailed, at least
in its initial push. 296 The official justification for the administration's action was that priorities had necessarily changed, and,
furthermore, that Americans' generous contributions to charities
mitigated much of the need for the legislation. The faith-based
291. No author, Gov Wilder is questioning Role of Thomas' Religion, Wall ST. J., July
3, 1991, at AS.
292. Editorial, In the Pocket of the Pope? WASH. POST, July 8, 1991, at Al.
293. /d.
294. 536 u.s. 639 (2002).
295. Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Exec. Order No. 13,199 (2001).
296. See Elizabeth Becker, Bush is Said to Scale Back His Religion-Based Initiative,
N.Y. nMES, Oct 14, 2001, at A14 (reporting that Bush had "set aside his most ambitious
plans to give federal money to religious charities" and would support a watered-down
version of his religion-based initiative).

684

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:641

proposals also looked different after an exchange between two
Republican activist evangelical ministers, Jerry Falwell and Pat
Robertson, that the September 11 attack might be God's retribution for the nation harboring the likes of the ACLU. 297 No
amount of apologizing 298 by the preachers could erase the underlying theocratic vision. Despite Bush's disassociation from the
remarks, the episode may well have led to his faith-based initiative being seen in a more hostile light. It also highlighted partisan divisions over competing visions of the Constitution, thereby
making compromise unlikely.
After a pause, however, the White House decided to bypass
the Congress (and Democratic and to a lesser extent Republican
opposition) and use administrative venues to try to accomplish
the President's goals. Thus the Department of Interior switched
policy on grants for historic preservation to allow federal funds
to be used to renovate churches.
2. A High and Impregnable Wall of Separation: Beginning
with George McGovern (with assists from Walter Mondale,
Jerry Brown, and Bill Clinton), secularists within the Democrats'
electoral coalition have increased considerably. Over half of the
delegates at the 1992 convention rarely attended church. 299 In a
world in which one of the best ways to predict a person's political affiliation is to ask how often he or she goes to church, those
who do not are Democrats. This is even truer among party professionals, who are not only unfamiliar with religion, but also are
"sometimes quite antagonistic" to it. 300 Candidates do not talk
about religion both because it would alienate part of the multicultural Democratic electorate and because the party's position
is that religion and government must be kept apart. Thus, the
"usual Democratic response" to Ronald Reagan's mention of religion was "either to ignore the religious issue or to denounce
Mr. Reagan for mixing religion and politics." 301
297. Gustav Niebuhr, After the Attacks: Finding Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at
A18 ("I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the
gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the
ACLU, People for the American Way-all of them who have tried to secularize America- I point the finger in their face and say 'you helped make this happen."').
298. Robertson, who had agreed with Falwell, claimed not to have grasped what his
colleague had said. Falwell, in turn, apologized. John F. Harris, Falwell Apologizes for
Remarks, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at C4.
299. GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE 2, 243,296 (2001).
300. Amy Sullivan, Do Democrats Have a Prayer? WASH. MONTHLY, June 2003, at
30, 35.

301. Charles Krauthammer, The Church-State Debate, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
17-24,1984,at16.
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Before Reagan, prayer in schools was either a nonpartisan
issue or an intramural squabble among Republicans. John Danforth, an Episcopalian (one of the so-called mainstream Protestant demoninations that believe in a high wall of separation)
stated that "the debate on school prayer is not between the
godly and the ungodly." 302 As the Reagan revolution brought
evangelicals in and pushed liberal Republicans out, prayer took
on a more partisan cast. Yet the usual Democratic response remained the same. 303
Reagan's victory confirmed that the evangelicals had the offense, and after Justice O'Connor joined the Court, the cases
sustaining the nativity scene, the chaplain, and some parochial
school aid fused to inspire the title of an Anti-Defamation
League book a few years later: Lowering the Wall. 304 There had
to be a Democratic response. A tactical response in the debate
over a constitutional amendment was that prayer in schools was
already constitutionally available-so lonfo as it was silent-and
that only silent prayer is truly voluntary. 30
The problems that religion posed for Democrats were real.
Why was evangelical participation bad, but participation by African-American ministers good? Why did Catholics err in politicizing abortion but not the nuclear freeze? What if the Regublicans' position on prayer was as popular as polls suggested? 6
The Democratic position, opposing what evangelicals
wanted as matters of both politics and principle, was clear. Implementing it was less so. With the exception of AfricanAmericans, Democrats believed in Jefferson's wall of separation.
Just as the Burger Court had lowered the wall in the mid-1980s,
so too did the Rehnquist Court adopt an accommodationist
stance, 307 with the exception of prayer at school functions. 308
Nevertheless, while the Court sustained a voucher program in
Cleveland, 309 it drew a line at the attempt to require states to
302. 130 CONG. REC. 4580 (1984).
303. Krauthammer, supra note 301, at 16.
304. See GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL (1991).
305. Senator Howard Metzenbaum made both points. 130 CONG. REC. 5835 (1984).
306. Prayer in the public schools consistently received 70 percent support, and Strom
Thurmond asserted 80 percent during the debates. 130 CONG. REC. 4319 (1984).
307. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) Regardless how one wishes to characterize City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we believe it is best understood in terms of the Court's vision of its own role in the constitutional order.
308. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. V. Doe, 530
u.s. 290 (2000).
309. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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treat religious institutions equally with secular ones in funding
programs? 10
The issue of religious accommodation was so touchy that
not once did a Democratic platform even mention prayer (voluntary or otherwise). Normally Democrats relied on surrogates
such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United
for the Separation of Church and State, the Anti-Defamation
League, and the newly created People for the American Way, to
decry the weakening wall. Nevertheless, during the 1984 campaign, Walter Mondale joined the issue directly when conservative columnist Fred Barnes asked Mondale during the first debate if he considered himself "a born again Christian" and how
his religious beliefs would "affect" his decisions as president. 311
As to the first, Mondale replied: "I don't know if I have been
born again, but I know I was born into a Christian family." 312 Instead of Jefferson's wa11 Mondale referred to a "line" that
should never be crossed. 31 3
Barnes then asked whether Mondale objected only to conservative ministers in politics. Mondale's wandering response
eventually settled on opposition to imposing one's religious
views on others: "that's where I draw the line." A better followup by Barbara Walters elicited a condemnation of school prayer
and praise for the Senate's rejection of a prayer amendment
"because it will undermine the practice of honest faith in our
country by politicizing it." 314
Bill Clinton's ease with religion and religious language plus
the Republican emphasis on vouchers, which implicated both
public schools and teachers' unions, left the religion issue quiescent during his presidency. During the 2000 campaign, Democratic vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman made Democrats uneasy because he was unapologetic about the role of
religion in his life. "[O]nce I opened my mouth and actually professed my faith, to give glory and thanks to God for the extraordinary opportunit~ I had been given, those Hosannas turned to
'How dare he's"'. 15 Indeed, he and Republican Rick Santorum
cosponsored one of the first bills from the Bush faith-based ini310. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
311. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC llOB (1984).
312. /d.
313. /d.
314. /d. at 111B.
315. John B. Judis & Ruy Teixeira, Majority Rules, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5 &
12, 2002, at 19.
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tiative-a bill that provided more tax incentives for charitable
contributions.
The Bush program placed Democrats in a politically difficult position. They did not want to be seen as anti-religion, nor
did they want to be in a position of opposing anything that
helped social programs. Bush, or probably more correctly, John
Diiulio, the head of the new office, astutely added to Democrats'
discomfort by gaining the support of some prominent AfricanAmerican ministers and leaders. But the lightning rod on religion arose with the initiatives that came to be known as "charitable choice." In essence, religious charities could receive government money to do social work beyond current arrangements.
The first point of contention was the extent and methods of
separating religion from social work. The idea that federal
money could be used to proselytize made even some Republicans nervous. The Democrats let the Republicans engage in intramural infighting while staying silent themselves although
eventually Republicans in the House crafted something that they
could support.
When the proposals finally had a congressional hearing,
Democrats expressed their latent unease. Happily for them, they
were handed a politically acceptable way to oppose the effort by,
of all groups, the Salvation Army. An internal Salvation Army
document was leaked, claiming that the White House had promised to issue a regulation exempting religious groups from state
and local laws that ban discrimination against gays in hiring and
domestic partner benefits. 316 The Democrats' opposition could
now be cast as an issue of protecting existing nondiscrimination
policies. As the New York Times reported, "the overarching fear
among the Democratic lawmakers was that this effort to improve social services was a needless assault on hard-won civil
rights and the separation of church and state. "317 Or as Senate
Democratic leader Tom Daschle put it, "Some of the provisions
in the bill would allow an exemption [from] the civil rights laws
of this country for organizations who are the beneficiaries of this
new program. That concerns me a great deal. Rolling back the
mandates and the guidelines that we have with regard to tolerance in this country is unacceptable ... and I think that the Senate will take a very critical view of those provisions of the bill." 318
316. CONG. Q. WEEKLY, July 14,2001.
317. Elizabeth Becker, Bush's Plan to Aid Religious Groups Is Faulted, N.Y. nMES,
April27, 2001, at A17.
318. David Boyer, Bush Prods Senate on Faith-Based Bills, WASH. nMES, July 21,

688

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 21:641

As it turned out, the Senate did not have to decide. By the time
the House bill emerged, it had lost much of its glow of bipartisanship as the vote proceeded largely upon party lines. Then
September 11 caused (or allowed) the President to change priorities and attempt to implement his program administratively.
Whatever unease Democrats felt, they nevertheless have remained silent.
F. SUMMING UP THE PARTIES' VISIONS

Because the two parties' constitutions have been in place
for so long, they not only look forward; they also look backward.
They look forward, of course, because if either party achieves
electoral success, it can hope to do better than the Republicans
under Reagan and the first Bush and in fact place a majority of
true believers on the Court. Then, the natural assumption is, the
new majority will implement the victorious party's constitutional
vision. Whether it will work that way in reality is never certain.
There are reasons to believe that it will not happen.
More fundamentally, the parties' constitutional visions look
backward because the issues were framed by the Warren and
early Burger Courts. The two parties' constitutions bracket the
Warren Court, with the Republicans retreating almost fifty years
and the Democrats about thirty. Both parties build on the Warren Court legacy of forcing the South (and other outliers) to conform to the values of national elites. 319 Because the Warren
Court prevailed against the outliers, current constitutional battles are political, not geographical. Thus, by ending the largely
sectional nature of constitutional disputes, the Warren Court
laid the groundwork for constitutional issues to return to the ear20
lier fault lines of political battles, such as those over slaverl
and economic regulation. But as we have repeated, there now is
a difference because neither party claims the Court's position.
The Republicans have frozen their constitution at Brown. It
is the bygone world of small-town America, with the decided
improvement that racial discrimination is prohibited. Religion
can be a part of the schools, abortion may be criminalized, and
police practices are largely invisible to judicial scrutiny. Courts
know their subordinate place and stay there, though activism
may be required to get back to the right status quo.
2001, at Al
319. POWE, supra note 51, at 489-94.
320. Recall that Northern Democrats supported the continuation of slavery.
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By contrast, the rights-oriented Democratic position requires a return to the Warren Court and a judiciary actively willing to place certain values into the Constitution because that is
what right-thinking people would have in a good constitution.
Democrats look to a Court with the immodesty of Antonin
Scalia and the jurisprudence of William J. Brennan. The "Great
Court" is then coupled with an unacknowledged321 hostility to
elections. Whatever their rhetoric about facilitating voting and
voters, Democrats are unwilling to let elections decide the federal or state policies on affirmative action, criminal justice, abortion, and religion.
IV. THE THIRD WAY
At least compared to the Republican and the Democratic
visions, the Court's doctrines look like bipartisanship personified. The Warren Court's legendary criminal procedure decisions
still stand, but not for all they were worth. Affirmative action has
been tamed rather than eliminated (or left to run riot). Women
retain their right to an abortion, but the public need not fund it,
and children need parents. State sponsored prayer is unconstitutional, but it has been almost a generation since the last funding
program was struck down on establishment clause grounds. Not
all the Court's positions have been popular, but its middle
ground may approximate public attitudes better than either of
the two parties.
If we are correct that the Court has offered a third constitutional vision not in sync with either party's and that it is a new
phenomenon, what is happening? There are many possible explanations, and they are not mutually exclusive. But first, a question arises with our analysis. Have we seen a third vision enunciated by the Court, or have we simply seen a swing vote prevail in
what otherwise were positions mimicking those of the political
parties?
There are, of course, factions on the Court that agree with
the Republican and Democratic positions. What is crucial, however, is that even if the original third vision began as a compromise, it has taken hold. This has occurred by Justices on the
Court coming to embrace the third vision, and it has occurred by

321. But not unrecognized. See TuSHNET, supra note 8, at 177-81; RICHARD POSNER,
BRE";KING TilE DEADLOCK 179 (2001); see also id. at 142 ("Judicial liberalism has long
s1grufied a distrust of democratic process.").
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attrition. Sitting Justices are free to ignore the parties' constitutional visions, but a nominee going through the confirmation
process is not so fortunate. A nominee will be acutely aware of
parties' positions because they will inform the Senators' questioning. Indeed, new Justices often must be committed to the
"compromise" in order to make it through the political process.
As long as there is divided government or a closely divided Senate, we are likely to see replacements favoring-or at least
nominally committed to continuing-the third way. What was
once a compromise or simply the opinion of the swing Justice
thus becomes the status quo. Depending upon one's belief about
the effect of precedent on Justices, the third way may persist
even with a shift to a less divided government. Whether it is a
commitment to stare decisis or a new preferred outcome is beside the point. The third way holds.
The three-vision world is an unprecedented phenomenon.
Why has it occurred? We have just offered two explanations: recruitment and stare decisis. Another issue involving recruitment
suggests a more systemic change. Justices the past quartercentury have spent their primary careers as jurists with little or
no time in the political vineyards. It was not always so. Justices
who came to the Supreme Court from careers as Senators, governors, SEC chairmen, or close friends of the President did not
always simply adopt the positions of their parties when they
moved to the Court. However, their deep involvement in politics
and political parties, often as leaders who helped shape the visions of their parties, surely made them more in sync with the
constitutional vision of their parties.
Distinctions among Justices may be even more subtle than
whether or not they come to the Court as jurists or politicians.
Over the past twenty years, two types of Supreme Court Justices
have been appointed. The first are those who took seats on the
courts of appeals as a natural stepping stone to the Supreme
Court. With that goal in mind, they strove to be visible to the
important constituency groups within their party, and they carried out lobbying campaigns (with varying degrees of subtlety)
to achieve their goal. Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg (not to mention Bork) fall within this category. Not surprisingly, their judicial positions mirror those of their party.
The second type are those who went to the bench without
the slightest expectation of ever reaching the Supreme Court.
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For them-O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-the nomination
was just as fluky as if they had been hit by lightning. 322 Since they
never expected to reach the Supreme Court, they had neither
lobbied for the job nor attached themselves firmly to the ideology of their party.
Whatever their past, judges who are promoted to the Supreme Court generally have needed to disassociate themselves
with their parties. Partisanship may well have put them on the
bench in the first place, but after their initial appointment, their
party ties had to be benched. Indeed, actions on their part that
differed from their party's perceived position are often used subsequently as testimony to their independence. This is not to say
that career judges are nonideological, but that the things that
shape their ideology may differ from those whose ideology has
been shaped in the crucible of politics. So, while on many issues
the third way may be solely a function of vote aggregation on a
closely divided Court, it is also the case that even the more ideological Justices will differ with their parties. The views of Justice
Scalia on the First Amendment would have a hard time making
it into the Republican platform, sexually related matters excluded, as might the late Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on the
Fourth Amendment. Justices differing with their parties is nothing new, but the practice of recruiting Justices from the rank of
judges may increase the tendency toward a third way.
Another explanation may involve the judicialization and legalization of politics. Even though the inordinate influence of
the judiciary on a democratic polity traces its origins to the very
beginning of the republic, few would doubt the ever-growing nature of issues that have become legalized. Increased legalization
often involves constitutionalization of issues. At the least, constitutional issues hover overhead. Political decisions are increasingly perceived as penultimate, often awaiting a court's blessing
or rejection. Over the past thirty years, Tocqueville's famous observation that political issues become legal ones has become
even more descriptive. 323 That said, the activist Warren Court
rarely struck down federal statutes and never invalidated a live,
important federal statute. 324 Some have argued that politicians
322. O'Connor described her appointment in exactly this term. SANDRA DAy
O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF LAW xii (2003).
. 323. Of course, as Mark Graber demonstrates, Tocqueville's observation was wholly
mcorrect when made. Mark Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004).
324. See L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of Judicial Review, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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now are willing to make decisions with little rigorous constitutional thinking because it is up to the courts to determine constitutionality. That is not to say that politicians are indifferent to
constitutionality or do not opine about the Constitution, but that
they do not attend to constitutional issues in the same wals
knowing that a court will ultimately decide constitutionality. 3 5
In such an environment it may not be so surprising that the Justices are carving their own way.
In addition to lawmakers and others seeing judicial decisions at all levels as the final step in policymaking, the Justices
often seem to believe that about themselves on many of the most
important and contentious issues. 326 Though Justices can avoid
tackling an issue by denying cert., "digging" a case after they get
it, or sidestepping an issue even if they reach the merits, they
seem to be less and less willing to do so for major issues. 327 Despite some speculation to the contrary, there was no way that the
Supreme Court was going to avoid taking Bush v. Gore. Not
only did political actors seek the Court's involvement, the Court
itself believed its intervention was necessary. 328 The ideas of a
robust political question doctrine 329 or "passive virtues" 330 seem
almost quaint; indeed in many quarters they are seen as irresponsible. As the parties have diverged in their understanding of
the Constitution and Justices of all ideological stripes have become more activist, it is not surprising that more constitutional
visions have emerged.
Not only do more issues find their way into courts, when
they reach the Court's agenda, with some exceptions, they get
decided. Constitutional law is made. Parties and legislatures, on
the other hand, have a very different decisional calculus. Parties
have the ability to expound their constitutional ideas without
ever really reaching a concrete decision. So too with legislatures
as the parties in government. Most issues never make the

697,721 (2003).
325. Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit, 51 DUKE L.J. 435,440-54 (2001)
326. See Powe, supra note 324, at 730-31; H.W.PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
32 7. See PERRY, supra note 326.
328. It would be interesting to learn the cert. vote. It is possible that several Justices
engaged in defensive denials, see id. at 198-212, but we suspect that most felt that they
had to take the case even if they felt that the decision should be made elsewhere.
329. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002)
330. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
]., concurring); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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agenda, let alone become law. 331 A minority has extraordinary
veto powers, and special interest groups on the right and left
wield this power with great effect. When an issue does become
law, it is almost always the product of compromise. The constitutional vision of a party rarely gets voted on. The point is that the
decision processes of courts and legislatures differ. With increased decisional responsibility moving to the Supreme Court,
we might expect to see a new phenomenon emerge, such as a
persisting third way, that heretofore had not existed.
Though these structural issues such as recruitment patterns
and locus of decisions may help explain three visions rather than
two, they do not compel the phenomenon. For that, we return to
where we began, the need to focus on parties to understand the
outputs of governing regimes.
Whether or not one agrees with our evaluation of changes
in the Court and among the Justices, there has been an undoubted change in our two national political parties, at least as it
relates to the parties in government. By almost any measure, the
two national political parties are more ideologically cohesive,
and they have become more polarized. We have documented the
differences on some major constitutional issues, but it is true
over a wide range of issues. 332 We have noted the increase in
party cohesion scores within both of the houses and in presidential support scores.
With regard to the parties in the electorate, there has been
change as well, though characterizing the change is a bit more
complicated than we can elaborate here. 333 Generally speaking,
the parties are more "extreme" in their positions and more polarized. There is little ideological overlap. This is explained in
large part by the disappearance of conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Republicans. Equally important, however, is
where the power centers now lie in the Congress. Southern Democrats not only made the party more conservative, given the
331. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(1984).
332. See STEPEHNSON, surpa note 1.
333. The data on the electorate are less clear. There is an extensive debate over
whether there has been a partisan realignment in the electorate. The debate includes the
definition of a realignment. Paradigmatically, a partisan realignment occurs when the the
minority party becomes the majority party. See WALTER D. BURNHAM, CRITICAL
ELECTIONS: THE MAINSPRING OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1971). Whatever the outcome
of the realignment debate, change has occurred. Many Southern Democrats have
switched parties, and the strength of Republicans in the South can also be explained by
replacement.
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seniority system they also wielded a huge amount of power. No
longer. In both parties, the safe districts that lead to seniority
tend to be at the extremes. Regardless of the increasing polarization of the parties' presidential wings as reflected in the platforms the past structure of congressional power mitigated the
output. That is less true today. Ironically, as the politics of Congress becomes more ideologically extreme, ideological noncentrist jurists are less likely to survive a congressional vetting.
More to the point, Justices have been and will be less likely to
defer to congressional understandings of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
What we have described is one answer to Larry Kramer's
lament in We the Courf 34 as well as a way of clarifying what
Charles Fried finds "perplexing" in Five to Four. 335 Even though
Kramer is right on target with his explanation of the Rehnquist
majority's judicial imperialism, he was not describing a Court
that has vanquished the field from constitutional politics. It may
well be that "[t]he idea of constitutional politics outside the
amendment process is, to the Rehnguist Court, a threatening
and possibly oxymoronic proposal" 336 just as once the idea that
the earth moves was anathema to the Pope. The Court may wish
to preempt constitutional politics, but it cannot. Thus Casey's
diktat that Americans should abandon their fights over abortion
had the same effect on the abortion debate that the Pope's antiCopernican conclusion had on the earth's movement around the
sun. There is and has been for over thirty years a robust debate
outside the Court on the meanings of the Constitution. That debate has been driven by politics and therefore is impossible to
halt.
Fried claims "we cannot map the split [on the Court] into a
coherent political vision." 337 We have. The split between those
who auditioned for the Court and those who didn't represents
334. Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, October Term 2000 Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
335. Charles Fried, The Supreme Coun, October Term 2001 Foreword· Five to Four,
116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 195 (2002).
336. Kramer, supra note 334, at 160; accord Laurence Tribe, Bush v. Gore and its
Disguises, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 290 (2001) ("[T]he Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority have little but disdain for Congress as a serious partner in the constitutional enterprise, and not much patience with 'We the People' as the ultimate sources of sovereignty
in this republic.").
337. Fried, supra note 335, at 1%.
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the split between advocates of the Republican and Democratic
constitutions and those going a third way. Moreover, apart from
that split, it may be that neither the Republican nor the Democratic constitutional vision is sufficiently coherent for Fried. As
we have shown, however, politics created those visions, and the
parties have found them sufficiently coherent to last for decades.
Even if we are mistaken about causes and predictions, we
have nevertheless documented a two-way split between the parties on a number of major constitutional issues and described a
very active debate against a background of an imperial Court.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated the way that political needs
create constitutional visions that, in turn, escalate the intensity of
the debate. This has occurred twice before in American history,
with the intense debates over slavery and economic regulation.
Both times the result was a complete victory for one of the parties.
We have documented what we think is a different, interesting, and important phenomenon over the past thirty years. We
also think, however, it provides a template for looking into the
future. Divided government has been a recent staple in American politics. Though the government has not always remained
divided as some predicted, the margins have been close enough
so that neither party is dominating the national political process.
Though much has been made of the effect of divided government on policy, we have linked it to outcomes on the Supreme
Court. Partisan division may not affect an individual Justice's
decisions, but what it may do is give us Souters, Kennedys, and
the like, who may reinforce third-way approaches offered by Justices such as O'Connor.
The debates over the confirmation of John Roberts and
Samuel Alito demonstrate that at least three of the four issues
we highlighted-abortion, religion, and race-remain contested.
As with the Clinton presidency, the Democrats appear unwilling
to challenge the Court on criminal procedure issues, although we
suspect they would like to. It also is interesting to see what issues
may take a third path in the future. Arguably, this has occurred
with federalism, although like presidential power, it is hard to
separate theoretical positions of the parties from immediate policy interests. For example, Republicans rarely seem to mind federally controlled crime policies despite their general argument to
return power to the states. Democrats rarely call for more power
to Washingto'l as a theoretical matter, though there is little
doubt about the difference between the parties on the general
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role of states versus the federal government. We may however
hear the virtues of states as laboratories for experimentation
when it comes to gay marriage. The Democrats' opposition to
the Court has largely focused on the specific issue-guns near
schools, protection for violence against women, protection of the
environment-rather than the issue of federalism per se. One
could argue that the Court's federalism jurisprudence is in sync
with the Republican Party, but one might equally argue that it
has started down a third road. An argument could be made that
a third way is beginning to occur with capital punishment, and
maybe the same is true with regard to gay rights. One can even
imagine it occurring over issues of property rights and gun control. Whatever the Court does, however, it will be accompanied
by a full debate between the parties over what the Constitution
"really" means.

